

Non-Military Security in the Wider Middle East

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Most studies on Middle East security focus on traditional threats such as military aggression and terrorism. This draft report examines the scope and dimensions of a broadened regional security agenda. It focuses on three specific issues: the opium trade in Central and Southwest Asia; unregulated population movements from the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan and North Africa; and maritime piracy around the Horn of Africa and Arabian Peninsula. Although Washington is not directly affected by any of these “soft” or “grey area” challenges, they are relevant for the United States in at least five respects. First, they represent a subset of the transnational problems that both the Clinton and Bush administrations have emphasized as a growing threat to national and international stability (such as international organized crime, corruption and generalized non-state violence and chaos). Second, they have, in varying degrees, undermined and distorted institutional state capacity, trade and (legitimate) economic growth in a region that is of geostrategic importance to Washington. Third, all carry significant implications for the lives, welfare and safety of ordinary citizens, including Americans. Fourth, in certain instances they have interacted with other sources of political tension to act as an additional catalyst for inter-state hostility and rivalry. Finally, because these challenges cannot be readily deterred by established mechanisms of border security, they necessarily require innovative and novel countermeasures—something that the United States is well placed to facilitate, both by virtue of its resources and global leadership role.

Most studies of Middle East security examine traditional threats such as direct military aggression and terrorism. However, the regional security agenda in this part of the world also encompasses issues as broad and wide ranging as narcotics, illegal migration, and maritime piracy.

This article examines the dynamics and scope of nontraditional threats in the wider Middle East. Its purpose is to provide a more comprehensive picture of current security trends in the Middle East by focusing analytical attention on challenges that extend beyond the narrow strictures of power politics and its emphasis on territorial sovereignty and clearly defined external aggression. Three specific issues are discussed: the opium trade in Central and Southwest Asia; unregulated population movements from the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and North Africa; and maritime piracy around the Horn of Africa and Arabian peninsula.

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The Opium Trade in Southwest and Central Asia

Scope and Dimensions

Production. The vast majority of the opium and refined heroin that is produced and trafficked in Southwest and Central Asia originates from Afghanistan. During 2000–2001, 1,685 hectares of land were devoted to poppy cultivation, generating a potential yield of 74 metric tons (MT) of opium gum. Although this is a substantial decline on 2000's figures (see Table 1), it represents only a temporary reduction in supply and is one that is largely attributable to a Taliban ban on opium production in July 2000. However with the fall of the movement in 2001 following Operation Enduring Freedom, and no viable government yet in place, production levels have once again soared (particularly in the drug-endemic provinces of Nangarhar, Helmand, Kandahar, and Oruzgan). The United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) estimates that poppy cultivation will be at least at its mid-1990s level by the end of 2002 and that overall opium yield will soon approach 2000's peak of 3,656 MT.¹ This would equate to an approximate heroin output of 365 MT—20 times the annual U.S. "requirement"—and, if realized, would once again place Afghanistan as the world's leading source of refined opiates.

Trafficking. Most of the drugs processed in Afghanistan for external consumption are smuggled to Europe. Only small amounts are trafficked to the United States (roughly

Table 1
Poppy cultivation and opium yield in Afghanistan, 1992–2000

Opium	2001	2000	1999	1998	1997	1996	1995	1994	1993	1992
Potential harvest (Ha)	1,685	64,510	51,500	41,720	39,150	37,950	38,740	29,180	21,080	19,470
Eradication	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Cultivation	1,685	64,510	51,500	41,720	39,150	37,950	38,740	29,180	21,080	19,470
Potential yield (MT)	74	3,656	2,861	2,340	2,184	2,099	1,250	950	685	640

Source: U.S. State Department, 2002

five percent in 2001—approximately one MT), which continues to be supplied mainly by narcotics cultivated and refined in Colombia (the bulk of which transit through Mexico).² The traditional European route passes via Pakistan's southern seaboard, Iran, and Turkey through one of two Balkan corridors: northward from Turkey to Bulgaria, Romania, and the Czech Republic; or westward through Greece, Albania, Macedonia, Croatia, and Slovenia. Pakistani traffickers based in Quetta organize most of these shipments, coordinating their activities with Kurdish brokers and sub-contractors in Iran and Turkey.³ In the first 10 months of 2001, 6 MT of heroin and 4.7 MT of opium were seized in Pakistan, most of which were intercepted by Islamabad's Anti-Narcotic Force-Baluchistan, which covers major trafficking routes from Afghanistan.⁴

Increasing volumes are also now being smuggled through the Central Asian Republics of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Krygyzstan, Turkmenistan, and especially Tajikistan.⁵ The main trafficking route appears to run from Afghanistan, via the Tajik districts of Gorno-Badakhshan, Shurobod, Moskovski, and Panj to the Ferghana Valley in Uzbekistan. From here opiates are redistributed and shipped through Krygyzstan and Kazakhstan to the European market by way of Russia and the Baltic states. A secondary route runs from Afghanistan, via the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Armenia to Turkey then onward to the Balkans (see Figure 1).⁶ U.S. State Department officials believe that roughly 80 percent of the narcotics currently produced in Afghanistan pass through Tajikistan, with one UN estimate putting the total volume of refined opiates transiting the country




Figure 1. Principal Afghan heroin trafficking routes in Central Asia. (Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 1999.)

between 1996 and 2000 at roughly 50 MT per year.⁷ In July 2002, Tajik border authorities seized a record single heroin consignment of 215 kilograms, which western narcotics officials now fear could be a harbinger of massively increased Central Asian drug flows post-Taliban.⁸

Two main factors have encouraged the growth of alternative conduits through Central Asia. First has been increased demand for heroin in Russia, which has created a lucrative intermediate market that can be supplied in tandem with Europe.⁹ Second, Iran has upgraded border security along its western frontiers with Afghanistan, which has made it far more difficult to use the state as a narcotics staging and trans-shipment point. Reflecting this, overall shipments of Afghan-sourced opiates passing through the country have plummeted by over 50 percent since 2000.¹⁰

Insurgents play a key role in facilitating the movement of opiates through Central Asia, something that has been especially true of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Although the Movement espouses a strong Islamic credo and stresses the need to highlight the dire socioeconomic, political, and religious conditions of Muslims in the Fergana Valley, it has also been intimately involved in organized criminal activities.¹¹ Indeed, for the past three years, the IMU has played a central role in facilitating the movement of illicit opiates from Afghanistan to Tajikistan and Krgyzstan, using profits from the trade (as well as ransoms from kidnapping) to buy arms as well as attract new recruits and cadres. Unconfirmed reports estimate that the organization is currently able to pay militants a monthly wage of between \$100–\$500—more than enough to mobilize followers from a region suffering severe unemployment and poverty.¹² Despite the emergence of a more fundamentalist leadership under Tohir Yuldashev, who replaced Juma Namanganiy in 2002 after he was killed during Operation Enduring Freedom,¹³ it is unlikely that the IMU will forgo what has proven to be a highly lucrative and reliable source of income, particularly given the absence of an alternative (Taliban-based) insurgent support network in Afghanistan.¹⁴

Implications

The Southwest and Central Asian opium trade has had a marked effect on stability in the region and further afield. First, it has contributed to a growing public health and addiction problem. The government of Iran admits to a hard-core heroin population of at least 1.2 million—one of the highest rates in the world—with an additional 800,000 casual users. Independent observers, however, believe these figures significantly understate the extent of the problem in the country and estimate that true totals could run as high as three million.¹⁵ Addiction has also dramatically increased in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Krgyzstan as they have become part of the Afghan opium export chain. According to the UNDCP, the number of registered drug takers in Tajikistan rose from 823 in 1995 to 6,243 in 2001, 75 percent of whom are habitual hard-core heroin users. As indicative is Krgyzstan, where 68 percent of drug abusers are now thought to be taking heroin and opiate derivatives (compared to 12 percent in 1991).¹⁶

Apart from addiction, intravenous heroin use has helped to foster the spread of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). This is emerging as a particularly serious problem in Kazakhstan, with one Presidential Commission reporting a four-fold increase in the number of (drug-related) positive HIV cases between 2000 and 2001.¹⁷ Problems in Krgyzstan have been just as great. Indeed, according to data from the Soros Foundation, as many as 32 to 49 percent of intravenous drug users in Osh—a principal trans-shipment point for heroin from Tajikistan—are now HIV-positive.¹⁸

International health experts have increasingly emphasized the worsening drug-disease situation in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Central Asia and are now warning that the region could be on the brink of an “AIDS explosion.”¹⁹

Second, the opium trade has contributed to growing social instability by fueling high rates of drug-inspired crime. This has emanated both from users struggling to finance their addiction and traffickers and distributors striving to gain control of a greater share of the narcotics market. Each year, roughly 8,500 drug-related crimes occur in Uzbekistan, approximately 10 percent of all felonies that are detected and registered in the Republic.²⁰ Much of the civil violence in Russia similarly is fueled by heroin sales as gangs compete for lucrative sales territory and addicts steal to feed their habit. According to the Ministry of Interior (MVD), heroin-related offenses across the country increased 4.5 percent during the first 9 months of 2001, whereas those of organized syndicates rose by more than 25 percent.²¹ This culture of deviance is fast eliminating standard notions of civil society in cities such as Moscow and St. Petersburg, where crime is seen not only as the fast track to success but increasingly the only path to survival.

Third, the costs associated with trying to control opium imports have further weakened already fragile economies by forcing the diversion of scarce resources to counternarcotic efforts. In Pakistan, for instance, drug prevention and reduction initiatives—the majority of which will be devoted to opium interdiction and control—are projected to result in expenditures of approximately half a billion dollars over the next five years.²² In Iran, interdicting and mitigating the effects of Afghan narcotics is estimated to cost the government around \$800 million a year in border security and \$68 million in demand reduction and community awareness programs.²³ Central Asian experts argue the economic burden in countries such as Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan has been just as great, exacerbating fiscal dislocation and underdevelopment in a region where unemployment already runs to around 50 percent and average wages amount to as little as \$10 to \$20 per month.²⁴

Fourth, money from illicit heroin sales has contributed to political instability and heightened the danger of regional states being reduced to “narcocracies” along the lines of Burma and Colombia. Certainly the industry has demonstrated an ability to buy and co-opt official allies and protectors, particularly in the intensive transit states of Central Asia. U.S. officials specifically point to this problem in Tajikistan, alleging that top officials have long had an active hand in the drug trade to support lifestyles that in no way reflect marginal government salaries.²⁵ Problems have been just as acute in Tajikistan, where heroin-related profits could constitute as much as a third of the country’s overall gross domestic product (GDP).²⁶ Regional observers believe much of this money is siphoned off by the political and military establishment and is now a largely accepted bureaucratic practice. As one former high-ranking member of the Internal Affairs Ministry somewhat candidly comments: “The people [behind] the [Tajik] drug business today have stars on their shoulders and armies behind them.”²⁷

Heroin has also helped to fuel internal conflict and armed insurrection against the state. Indeed, insurgents have been only too willing to be co-opted by the opium trade in order to generate finance and secure logistical benefits. During the civil war in Tajikistan, narcotics were used extensively to pay for food, weapons, and ammunition, accounting for as much as 70 percent of the anti-Tajik rebels’ overall operating revenue by 1997.²⁸ The *Taliban* sustained its war effort against the Northern Alliance (NA) in a largely similar manner. According to the Paris-based *Observatoire Geopolitique de Drogues* (OGD), income taxed from the Afghan heroin base netted the movement at least \$60 million between 1996 and 2000, which was used to purchase everything from weapons and ammunition to food, fuel, clothes, and transportation.²⁹

Unregulated Mass Population Movements in the Wider Middle East

Scope and Dimensions

Unregulated mass population movements—defined as the large-scale, unsanctioned movement of people across national borders as a result of war, conflict, persecution, environmental degradation, or economic dislocation—have long been a serious issue in the wider Middle East.³⁰ The extent of the problem can be gauged, at least in rough terms, by the size of the region's external and internal refugee populations. At the end of 2001 these figures stood at 4,274,704 and 4,475,063 respectively, roughly 35 percent of the worldwide total. Equally as illustrative is the extent of the region's overall "population of concern," which provides an indication of the number of people living in a hazardous or possibly threatening situation (and, therefore, potentially seeking to undertake external flight). This currently stands at 5,947,298 individuals, which equates to nearly a third of the global tally (see Table 2).

The largest and politically most significant cross-border movements over the last 10 years have been associated with 2 main triggering events and 1 generalized cause: the

Table 2
Selected refugee and population of concern figures in the wider Middle East
and regional countries of Asylum (as of end 2001)

County	Population of concern ³¹	External refugee population	Main (Mid-East) states of external asylum	Internal refugee population ³²
Afghanistan	1,226,098	3,586,852	Iran 1,482,600 Pakistan 2,000,000 Tajikistan 15,354 Uzbekistan 8,348	6
Algeria	169,497	7,845		169,422
Iraq	130,503	525,971	Iran 386,000 Saudi Arabia 5,177	128,142
Iran	1,868,011	88,673	Iraq 23,893	1,868,000
Kazakhstan	119,543	2,506		19,531
Kyrgyzstan	9,766	749		9,296
Kuwait	139,335	425		1,255
Libya	11,679	606		11,684
Pakistan	2,199,379	10,011		2,198,797
Tajikistan	18,068	47,250	Kyrgyzstan 9,805 Uzbekistan 30,001	15,346
Turkmenistan	14,496	243		14,005
Uzbekistan	40,923	3,573		39,579
Total	5,947,298	4,274,704		4,475,063
% Global total	30%	35%		37%

Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), June 2002.

1990-1991 Persian Gulf War; drought and civil instability in Afghanistan (1999–2002); and growing patterns of illegal migration from North Africa to southern Europe.

The Gulf War and subsequent unrest in Iraq created one of the largest, fastest, and most widespread population movements in history. As many as five million people may have been uprooted by this conflict, most of which occurred in three distinct stages. First, in the wake of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait (August 1990), came a mass flight of at least 2 million Arab and Asian migrant workers, the bulk of which relocated in neighboring countries until they could return home. The largest exodus involved roughly 1.5 million Egyptian guest workers, which were forcibly driven from Iraq after Cairo vocally voiced its opposition to Hussein's actions. However, a significant number of Yemenis were also effectively expelled from Saudi Arabia when Riyadh, reacting to Sanaa's support of Baghdad, refused to renew their employment permits.

Following the outbreak of hostilities between Iraq and the allied coalition, a second war-induced wave of migration took place, involving at least 650,000 foreign nationals who had remained in Iraq and Kuwait, with most taking refuge in Jordan, Syria, Iran, and Turkey. Hussein's brutal suppression of civilian rebellions in northern and southern Iraq during the spring of 1991 generated a further mass demographic outflow, this time involving as many as two million Kurds and *Shi'a*, most of whom fled to hastily constructed shelters and camps set up in Turkey and especially Iran. At the height of the Kurdish influx, Tehran hosted more refugees than any other country in the world.³³

Drought and civil instability in Afghanistan has similarly acted as a major stimulus for unregulated migration. Recurrent late rains and accompanying famine since 1999, a highly damaging civil war between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance (NA) and the U.S.-led military counterterrorism intervention following the September 11 attacks in Washington and New York (Operation Enduring Freedom) have essentially destroyed the country's social infrastructure and dramatically undermined international relief efforts. According to the United Nations (UN), drought and war had caused food prices to rise by between 30 and 50 percent by the end of 2001, placing at least 1.5 million Afghans in clear risk of starvation.³⁴

Combined, the interaction of natural and human-made disaster has galvanized a mass internal and external population exodus throughout and from Afghanistan. Many of those fleeing the debilitating effects of drought and war have been housed in makeshift camps located in northern and western Afghanistan. However, substantial numbers have also sought external haven. As of the end of 2001, in excess of 3.5 million Afghans were sheltering in neighboring countries, the vast bulk of whom had fled to Pakistan. Some 2 million refugees are now thought to be in the country, mostly crowding into camps located in Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). Significant flows have also been recorded west across the Rigestan Desert to Iran, where prior to the institution of a closed border policy in 2001, UN officials had been reporting arrivals at the rate of several hundred per day.³⁵ Together, these 2 countries currently host 3.4 million Afghan refugees—2 million in Pakistan and 1.4 million in Iran (see Table 2).

The third main factor associated with mass and politically significant unregulated population flows in the wider Middle East has been the growth of illegal migration from North Africa to southern Europe. Several push-pull drivers have encouraged this movement, including a highly debilitating civil war in Algeria since 1992; a general lack of development and economic performance across North Africa; the relative wealth, prosperity, and stability of Western Europe; and the possibility of accessing and benefiting from a largely frontier and visa-free European Union (EU).³⁶ At the same time, the

institution of increasingly restrictive legal, administrative, and physical asylum procedures and barriers—both national and multilateral³⁷—has led to the proliferation of human trafficking rings as would-be migrants have sought alternative and irregular means of entry through the European southern backdoor.³⁸

The extent of illegal immigration and use of human smuggling networks from the Maghreb is difficult to measure, precisely because this movement is illicit and, therefore, clandestine in nature. However, according to the International Labor Office (ILO), Spain, France, Italy, and Malta—the major recipients of trans-Mediterranean demographic flows—have a combined illegal migrant population of at least 1.1 million (the EU as a whole is thought to absorb roughly 500,000 illegals every year). Given its proximity and the large number of North Africans already resident in southern Europe, it is reasonable to assume that the bulk of these irregulars originate from the Maghreb or have at least transited the region from states to the south and west (in 1998 Morocco expelled 17,178 illegal entrants, many of whom had trekked thousands of miles across the Sahara).³⁹ Spain, which is only 8 miles (14 kilometers) from the North African coast across the Straits of Gibraltar, has been an especially favored destination.⁴⁰ During 2001, over 13,000 illegal migrants were apprehended trying to enter the country via this route, doubling the previous year's cases.⁴¹

Although many irregulars attempt to enter southern Europe independently, an increasing number have come to rely on human traffickers to their passage. The average cost to be smuggled from the Magreb ranges from \$550 to \$4,000 depending on the route (and extent of border surveillance), in addition to expenses incurred for forged passports, residence permits, and visas.⁴² The methods used by traffickers in the Mediterranean region resemble those in other areas and typically involve syndicates engaged in a variety of illegal activities centered on the illicit trans-border movement of goods. These groups employ intermediaries in source countries to make contact with would-be migrants and arrange their papers and finalize journey logistics. Transport is generally provided by boat captains who specially charter ships for the purpose or by crews of regular vessels such as fishing trawlers and ferries.⁴³ On arrival, migrants are immediately made to settle any outstanding balances owed to the trafficking syndicate. If these charges cannot be met, clients are held under house arrest until final payment is either made—generally by relatives—or earned by means of semi-indentured employment.⁴⁴

Implications

The various unregulated population movements described earlier have important implications for both sending and receiving states. Civilians fleeing Iraq, Algeria, Tunisia, Afghanistan, and Morocco have acted as a source of political embarrassment to their respective home governments. By their very presence these displaced migrants have demonstrated fear and loathing of their ruling administrations, which, at least in the cases of Iraq, Afghanistan (under the *Taliban*), and increasingly, Algeria, have fed into international perceptions of repressive, undemocratic, and dysfunctional styles of governance. In the Algerian instance, this has occurred despite the existence of an antigovernment organization—the Armed Islamic Group (GIA)—that is, itself, generally recognized as extremist and brutal.

In addition, there have been occasional instances when refugees fleeing internal wars and general societal breakdown have formed the basis of overseas networks, providing crucial political and logistical support for indigenous insurgencies and rebel groups. The GIA provides a good case in point. The organization has benefited greatly from the

expatriate Algerian community in France, using this population to facilitate the transshipment of weapons, explosives, and logistics as well as a source from which to generate funds, recruits, intelligence, and haven.⁴⁵ As Gabriel Sheffer has observed, these types of activities have significant implications for the security and integrity of source countries, not least because they make it far easier to plan, prepare, and launch attacks on home soil.⁴⁶

Host states have also felt significant effects. Sudden demographic influxes have repeatedly undermined the ability of receiving states to integrate effectively third-country nationals by overburdening and further straining existing socioeconomic infrastructures. Often, this has encouraged established diaspora and expatriate communities to confront governments over issues pertaining to real or perceived deprivation in areas such as unemployment, small businesses, housing, education, and other welfare services.⁴⁷ Clashes and localized protests staged by Muslims in France, Iraqi Kurds in Iran, and Moroccans in Italy are all indicative of tensions that have arisen in this regard.⁴⁸

Equally as problematic is the anti-foreign resentment, suspicion, and violence that frequently accompanies unexpected cross-border flows. Effects of this sort have been especially prevalent in the poorer regions of southern and eastern Europe, where migrants from North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia (both legal and illegal) have been viewed as a direct threat to underlying cultural, economic, social, and political stability. Reflecting these perceptions has been a growing sub-culture of support for neo-Nazi hate groups such as *Troisième Voie* in France, Golden Dawn in Greece, Combat 18 (C18) in the United Kingdom, the Lazio “Ultras” in Italy, the People’s Extra Parliamentary Opposition (VAPO) in Austria, the *Circulo Espanol de Amigos de Europa* (CEDADE) in Spain and the National Democratic Party (NDP) and *Republikaner* in Germany. These organizations are now seen by European intelligence and law enforcement agencies as posing as much of a threat to democratic society as the radical left-wing terrorist groups of the 1970s and 1980s.⁴⁹

In several instances migrant communities have additionally played an important role in encouraging organized criminal activity in their adopted societies. Many of the most lucrative heroin trafficking routes from Southwest Asia, for instance, are run or at least facilitated by Kurdish refugees in Turkey and Iran. These same communities have also been closely involved with the smuggling of food, fuel, and commercial produce through the Afghan Transit Trade (ATT)⁵⁰ arrangements, helping to fuel an increasingly powerful black economy throughout Central Asia and Iran.⁵¹ Property theft groups, prostitution rings, and drug syndicates in southern Europe have similarly been identified with illegal migrant populations, particularly Algerians in France and Moroccans based in Italy and Spain.⁵²

Finally, displaced populations have occasionally contributed to inter-state rivalry and hostility. Typically this has occurred when refugees have been exploited as strategic pawns in the power plays of competing regional states; Iran’s use of Kurds to foment anti-government rebel activity in Iraq is a good example. Problems have also occurred when receiving governments have moved to repatriate illegal workers to unreceptive home countries. This has certainly been a source of growing tension between the economically pressed states of North Africa and administrations in Italy, France, and Spain.⁵³ The Maghreb countries have especially criticized the task forces and intelligence databanks that have been set up to track and expel irregular migrants.⁵⁴ Algeria’s president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, has equated such defenses with the Great Wall of China, whereas Morocco has argued they are reflective of a generally hypocritical EU stance on market forces—one that demands the unrestricted movement of goods but denies the free passage of labor.⁵⁵

Maritime Piracy Around the Horn of Africa and Arabian Peninsula

Scope and Dimensions

Maritime piracy and armed violence at sea—defined by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) as an act of boarding (or attempted boarding) with the intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the intent or capability to use force in furtherance of that act—remains a pressing concern of the international community. In 2001, the Malaysian-based Regional Piracy Center (RPC) registered 335 attacks around the world, the second highest figure currently on record.⁵⁶

Although Southeast Asia continues to constitute the main area of concern, an increasingly serious problem has begun to emerge in the seas around the Horn of Africa and Arabian Peninsula. Between 2001 and June 2002, 37 actual and attempted attacks were recorded in this particular vicinity, an area bounded by Somalia, Djibouti, Yemen and the Red Sea. This tally is already approaching the total figure for the two years 1999–2000 (39) and more than trebles that for 1998 (11; see Table 3).⁵⁷

Ransoms and hostage taking constitute the most common forms of piracy around the Horn of Africa, the bulk of which are carried out by local militias that have virtual free run of the region. An Aden-based Somali operative by the name of Hassan Munya is thought to run the main syndicate, which is composed of five heavily armed ships—complete with gun cannons—that were originally stolen following the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1990. Munya's fleet is used to control and exploit a self-declared fishing and economic zone off the coast of Puntland and will, according to maritime security experts with operational knowledge of the region, confront any vessel that strays to within 50 miles of the shoreline.⁵⁸

Further down the coast several smaller groups exist. All are based out of Somali coastal villages notorious for warlordism and crime and have access both to rudimentary single shot weapons and pistols as well as more sophisticated assault and automatic rapid-fire rifles. The gangs were originally created to protect local fishing grounds from the poaching operations of Munya but now mostly engage in opportunistic attacks directed against both local and foreign vessels.⁵⁹ The militias generally operate independently from one another, each within a predefined and mutually agreed-on sphere of influence.⁶⁰

Assaults generally follow a typical pattern. Militias tend to use small, fast, and highly maneuverable attack craft, which allow them to make rapid and unexpected ap-

Table 3
Actual and attempted pirate attacks around the Horn of Africa, 1996–March 2001

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002 (January–June)
Red Sea (including Egypt)			2	1	14	14	9
Somalia/Djibouti	4	5	9	14	9	8	4
Yemen	1	5	–	–	1	1	1
Total	5	10	11	15	24	23	14

Source: International Maritime Bureau, 2001 (figures represent both *actual* and *attempted* attacks).

proaches against potential target vessels. Crew members are quickly rounded up before they can issue a general mayday or distress alert. They are then taken back to shore where they are imprisoned before a ransom is finally issued. If captured ships are small enough they will also be detained and berthed in inlets under militia control. Because the primary objective is to secure payments for the release of live hostages, lethal force is avoided as far as possible. However, if the pirates do confront opposition, they will show no compunction in carrying out a few “example killings” as a way of encouraging a more compliant attitude.⁶¹

Ransoms—which are usually phrased in terms of “fines” that have been imposed for the theft of sovereign fishing resources—start high, with demands of US\$1 million not uncommon. In most cases, however, the pirates will compromise and may well eventually settle for a final payment that is between a half and a quarter of this amount. Negotiations are normally conducted on an indirect basis—using intermediaries chosen by the militia groups—and facilitated by the IMB and other private companies such as the HART Group.⁶² During these discussions it is made clear that, in the event no satisfactory agreement is ultimately reached, crew members will be indefinitely imprisoned and ships and cargoes permanently impounded.⁶³

In addition to ransoms and hostage takings, piracy around the Horn of Africa has also taken the form of more traditional vessel and cargo theft. Assaults are directed mostly against ships transiting the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait or waiting designated entry time slots at anchorages off the Djibouti coast. This particular passageway, which forms the southern gate of the Red Sea, is one of the busiest in the world, forming a crucial trade link to Europe via the Suez Canal.⁶⁴ Diesel tankers have been an especially attractive target but other carriers, including those transporting relief supplies and automotive equipment, have also been targeted.⁶⁵ The IMB expects that these types of attacks will continue to proliferate, their frequency aided and abetted by the general lawlessness that is apparent in this part of eastern Africa.⁶⁶

Several factors have encouraged attacks off the Horn of Africa and Arabian Peninsula. First is the near total absence of coastal and port surveillance—a problem that has been especially acute in Somali waters, which remain effectively unpoliced. Second, many of the littoral states lack any effective system of governance and judicial prerogative, meaning that even if pirates are apprehended they are unlikely to be punished. Third, there has been a tendency for ships moving between the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Peninsula, and ports along the East African coast to sail within the 50-mile shoreline safety limit recommended by the IMB—a risk that is undertaken in order to save time and fuel on their journeys. Fourth, frequent use of unsecured radio VHF (very high frequency) communications has provided militias with an accurate and ongoing picture of ship movements and planned routings. Finally, there has been no shortage of potential targets, particularly around the heavily congested Bab-el-Mandeb Strait.⁶⁷

Implications

The impact of piracy around the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula has been felt across a number of dimensions. At the most basic level, it has constituted a direct threat to the lives and welfare of the citizens of a variety of flag states. In 2001, for instance, a total of 48 crew were taken hostage in attacks off Somalia and Djibouti, roughly a quarter of all abductions that took place in global waters during the year.⁶⁸ Seafarers exposed to this type of violence are known to have suffered considerable mental and psychological trauma, with some never going to sea again.⁶⁹

Although no American casualties were inflicted during the year, U.S. authorities have expressed some concern about the growing levels of violence around the Horn of Africa. Particular attention has focused on maritime attacks that have been mounted in the vicinity of the Bab-el-Mandeb straits, an area used extensively by American merchant carriers and vessels.⁷⁰

Second, piracy has contributed to the growth of parallel economic structures, which has both distorted fiscal stability and undermined tax/public allocation resource bases. This has been especially the case in Somalia and Yemen where internal instability, anarchy, and widespread corruption have fed into a proliferating black market. Most of the pirated merchandise originates from vessels attacked by local militias. However, there have also been indications that goods have been offloaded from extra-regional phantom ships—hijacked vessels that have been re-registered under false identities and flags of convenience for the purpose of illegal trading.⁷¹ Indeed, according to the IMB, Yemen and Somalia are both emerging as critical hubs for the perpetration of this particular form of organized maritime crime.⁷²

On a more general basis, piracy is beginning to detract from the region's status as a viable maritime trading corridor. Shipping companies and owners have expressed growing concern about the safety of their cargoes and crews and are now exhibiting an increased reluctance to pay the higher insurance premiums that are typically required for sailing in this part of the world. This is particularly so given that, in most cases, they have to pay their own legal costs in terms of post-attack investigations.

Should there be a decisive move away from the use of the sea-lanes around the Horn of Africa and Arabian Peninsula over the next few years, it will have significant implications for international maritime economic activity, curtailing a key commercial link between Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. This will not only deprive littoral governments of port-related income, it will also feed into longer surface transportation times and higher commodity freight costs for extra-regional trading states.

Third, piracy has played a pivotal role in undermining and weakening political stability by encouraging corruption. This has been particularly the case in Somalia and Yemen where port authorities and local government officials are known to play an integral role in the illegal discharge of cargo.⁷³ As noted earlier, the seriousness of this problem is reflected by the growing number of phantom ships that are now using these states as quick and easy venues for offloading illicit merchandise.

Fourth, there is a perceptible risk of piracy attacks triggering a major environmental disaster. The biggest danger lies in the heavily congested Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, where pirates are known to have tied up or thrown overboard crew members after raiding their vessels. Known as "rogue ships," these uncontrolled craft obviously have enormous implications with respect to the safety of maritime navigation, greatly increasing the possibility of a highly damaging mid-sea collision. The nightmare scenario is a major crash involving an oil tanker, a disaster that would be liable to generate extensive maritime damage and involve exorbitant long-term clean-up (and legal) costs.⁷⁴

Finally in the wake of Al-Qaeda's September 2001 attacks against the Pentagon and World Trade Center, growing concern has centered on the possibility of an unholy convergence emerging between piracy and international terrorism. Political corruption, combined with poor coastal surveillance has already contributed, at least partly, to a poor regional maritime security environment and is generally recognized to be one factor in the 2000 bombing of the USS *Cole* in Aden.⁷⁵ More to the point, it has made container and cargo ships highly vulnerable to terrorist seizure—either by extremists themselves or pirate intermediaries—and possible exploitation as logistical transportation carriers (both per-

sonnel and materiel) or platforms from which to launch devastating liquefied natural gas (LNG) attacks. The hijacking of a British-registered tanker off Somalia's northeastern coast in August 2002 is indicative of the potential threat that exists in this part of the world and is certainly one that is now figuring prominently in the security calculations of the International Maritime Organization.⁷⁶

Policy Implications for the United States

Threats such as piracy, drug trafficking, and unregulated population movements all have internal origins. However, they also have complex external ramifications that cross and blur traditional distinctions between the military, law and order, and civilian jurisdictions. Dealing with this situation will require a drastic reformulation of what security means and the mechanisms of its provision. At the national level, institutional forums for inter-agency cooperation will have to be expanded and developed to accommodate challenges that threaten broader societal, as opposed to more narrow, state interests. Above all, there will be a need for increased communication between the military and other departments such as public health, interior, coast guard, customs, and environment, combined with new executive functions to coordinate such multidimensional policy responses.

Given their transnational nature, purely nationally based responses will be insufficient to counter transnational threats. States must also be prepared to undertake concerted action at the international level and mobilize resources in unison with other states to attack, disable, or at least contain the vital pressure points that serve to sustain destabilizing grey area influences and processes.⁷⁷

The United States is well placed to facilitate institutional adaptation and cooperation of this sort, both by virtue of its resources and global leadership role. On a broad level, it could help states undertake more comprehensive, multidisciplinary threat assessments and national intelligence estimates, which draw on and integrate different analytical techniques, skills, and information resource bases.⁷⁸

Washington could also help to define the role existing multilateral arrangements can play in countering transnational dangers. Although alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were not designed to address "soft," grey area security challenges, they may be able to mitigate some of the symptoms of these challenges through the joint and combined use of intelligence assets, technological equipment, and information exchange. Equally there may be ways of exploiting institutional linkages across specific issue areas that will enable military and non-military bodies such as NATO, the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe, the Partnership for Peace Program, and the European Union to pursue the transnational security agenda more effectively and inclusively.⁷⁹

Finally, Washington could help to alleviate some of the problems associated with drugs, unsanctioned migration, and piracy through specific and directed policy responses. Particularly relevant in this regard would be the institution of new intelligence and information-sharing protocols that extend beyond traditional areas of national security. Just as critically, foreign aid and assistance could be channeled to help dampen some of the more important drivers of organized regional crime and unsanctioned migration such as poverty, corruption, institutional anarchy, and general socioeconomic underdevelopment. In both instances, measures could usefully build on the nascent bilateral mutual assistance frameworks that have been established to fight terrorism since September 11.

Notes

1. U.S. State Department, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2001*, VII-4, 5, available at (<http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2001/c6085.htm>). See also "The Poppies Bloom Again," *The Economist*, 20 April 2002; "Afghan Heroin Haul Seized," *The Financial Times*, 15 July 2002; and Tamara Makarenko, "Bumper Afghan Narcotics Crop Indicates Resilience of Networks," *Jane's Intelligence Review* 14(5) (May 2002), p. 28.
2. U.S. State Department, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2001*, VII-5.
3. Peter Chalk, *Non-Military Security and Global Order: The Impact of Violence, Chaos and Extremism on National and International Security* (London: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 38–39. See also "Central Asia's Narcotics Industry," *Strategic Survey* 1998/99 (London: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 1; and International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), "Drug Trafficking Routes in Central Asia," p. 276.
4. U.S. State Department, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2001*, VII-24.
5. It should be noted that Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Krygyzstan, and Tajikistan are now important opiate producers in their own right. The most important sources are the Chu Valley (which stretches from Krygyzstan to Kazakhstan), the Ferghana Valley (which cuts from Uzbekistan into Krygyzstan), and the Gorno-Badakhshan region in Tajikistan. See "Central Asia's Narcotics Industry," pp. 1–2.
6. Tamara Makarenko, "Crime and Terrorism in Central Asia," *Jane's Intelligence Review* (November 2000), p. 16. See also U.S. State Department, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2000*; and "Central Asia's Narcotics Industry," pp. 1–2.
7. U.S. State Department, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2001*, IX-129. In January 1999, Tajik President Imomali Rakhmanov told an international conference that drugs were being smuggled into his country from Afghanistan at the rate of one ton a day. Ahmed Rashid, *The Taliban. Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), p. 123.
8. "Afghan Heroin Haul Seized," *The Financial Times*, 15 July 2002.
9. See, for instance, U.S. State Department, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2001*, IX-110.
10. U.S. State Department, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2001*, X-20. See also "Drugs and Decay," *The Economist*, 31 March 2001.
11. Author interview with delegate attending the "Euro Atlantic Relationship: Ready for the Global Era" Wilton Park Conference, Wilton Park, UK, 21–25 May 2001.
12. Tamara Makarenko, "The Changing Dynamics of Central Asian Terrorism," *Jane's Intelligence Review* 14(2) (February 2002), pp. 37–38.
13. It is believed that Namanganiy was killed after several IMU camps in Afghanistan were targeted as part of the U.S.-led counterterrorism offensive to overthrow the Taliban.
14. Makarenko, "Bumper Afghan Narcotics Crop Indicates Resilience of Networks," p. 31.
15. Cedria Gouverneur, "The Enemy Within," *Le Monde Diplomatique* (March 2002), available at (<http://mondediplo.com/2002/03/14drug>). See also Rashid, *The Taliban. Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia*, 122; and Chalk, *Non-Military Security and Global Order*, pp. 45–46.
16. Robert Ponce, "Rising Heroin Abuse in Central Asia Raises Threat of Public Health Crisis," *Eurasia Insight* (14 August 2002), available at (<http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav032902a.shtml>).
17. U.S. State Department, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2001*, IX-73.
18. Heroin and Needles: Battling AIDS in Central Asia," *The New York Times*, 16 October 2000. In one survey conducted in Osh, 96% of respondents reported sharing needles to inject heroin, 35% of who admitted to using the same needle more than 20 times.
19. "Experts Mull Measures to Prevent HIV/AIDS Explosion in Central Asia" (14 May 2001), p. 1, available at (<http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/recpas/articles>).
20. "A Drug Free World of the 21st Century. We Can Do It!" *Information Bulletin* 1 (1999), p. 10.

21. U.S. State Department, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2001*, IX-110.
22. See U.S. State Department, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2000* (March 2001), available at (<http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/nrcpt/2000>).
23. Ibid. See also Blanche, "Iran Struggles with Narcotics Scourge," *Jane's Intelligence Review* (October 2000), p. 33.
24. Author interview, *Foundation pur la Recherché Strategique*, Paris, France, February 2001.
25. U.S. State Department, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2001*, IX-129.
26. "Tajik Upbeat About 'Most Backward' Republic," *The Washington Post*, 1 August 2002.
27. Ibid.
28. Makarenko, "Crime and Terrorism in Central Asia," p. 16.
29. Stefan Leader and David Wiencek, "Drug Money. The Fuel for Global Terrorism," *Jane's Intelligence Review* 12(2) (February 2000), p. 52; Rashid, *Taliban. Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia*, chapter 9; "Islamic Nerves," *The Economist*, 14 October 2000; and "Iran's Muscle Flexing Slows Taliban Drug Trade," *The Australian*, 8 September 1998.
30. This conception is wider than the formal international legal definition of refugee status as specified under the terms of the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. These two documents define a refugee as any person who is "outside of their own country, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail him or herself of the protection of that country." This conception is problematic largely because most mass movements of people in the contemporary world result from conditions other than persecution. For further details see Peter Chalk, "The International Ethics of Refugees," *The Australian Journal of International Affairs* 52(2) (1998), p. 154; and Gil Loescher, *Refugee Movements and International Security*, Adelphi Paper 268 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1992), p. 56.
31. Includes internally displaced persons, foreign refugees, and repatriated nationals.
32. This column refers to the number of internationally recognized refugees accorded sanctuary in the respective country.
33. Abi-Aad Naj and Michael Grenon, *Instability and Conflict in the Middle East. People, Petroleum and Security Threats* (London: Macmillan, 1997), p. 173; Chalk, *Non-Military Security and Global Order*, p. 117; Nicholas Van Hear, "Forced Migration and the Gulf Conflict," *Oxford International Review* (Winter 1991), 1990–91, 17–21; Loescher, *Refugee Movements and International Security*, p. 11. It should be noted that most of the Kurds sheltering in Iran have since returned to Iraq, though many not to their original homes. Despite this, Tehran continues to host one of the world's largest refugee populations, which, today, is made up mostly of displaced Afghans.
34. UNHCR, *Global Report, 2001*, pp. 270–272, available at (<http://www.unhcr.ch.html>). See also "Afghan Food Situation is Dire, AID Chief Says," *The Washington Post*, 11 October 2001.
35. UNHCR, *Global Report, 2001*, p. 270; "A Million Threatened by Famine in Afghanistan: UN," *Times of India*, 21 February 2001; "The Road of Last Resort," *The Washington Post*, 18 March 2001; "Famine Threatens 1 Million in Afghanistan," *The Washington Post*, 22 February 2001; "No Room for Afghans," *The Economist*, 13 January 2001.
36. Comments made by participants attending the transnational threat workshop of the "Euro-Atlantic Relationship: Ready for the Global Era" Wilton Park Conference, Wilton Park, 21–25 May 2001.
37. Many European states are adopting an increasingly narrow definition of "refugee" and the criteria to determine such status. Numerous EU member countries, for instance, no longer recognize those fleeing conditions of generalized violence and famine as *bona fide* refugees and individuals deserving of the right of *non-refoulement*. Certain high risk states have also enacted elaborate physical systems for enhancing external vigilance and surveillance. A good example is Spain, which is in the process of developing an integrated, high-tech immigration detection net-

work for the Andalusian coast that will be based on long-distance radar, thermal imaging cameras, night visors, infrared lighting, helicopters, and patrol boats. Equally, much of the EU's internal intelligence and police cooperation is similarly being driven by a common desire to reduce immigration and unwanted asylum into the Union. At the the Seville Summit in June 2002, Britain, Spain, and Italy urged their fellow member states to expedite the institution of common asylum rules, combined with greater border coordination and economic sanctions against countries that fail to take sufficient action against people smuggling. For further details see Peter Chalk, *The Evolving Dynamic of West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism* (London: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 133–136 and 144–150; his, "The International Ethics of Refugees," pp. 154–155; "Spain: Electronic Control of Strait," *Stewatch* 9(3–4) (1999), p. 4; "EU Summit Seeks to Stem Flow of Illegal Migrants," *The Age* (Australia), 22 June 2002; and "Issues to Watch," *The Financial Times*, 21 June 2002.

38. David Kornbluth, "Illegal Migration from North Africa: The Role of Traffickers," Proceedings of the International Conference on Migration and Crime. Global and Regional Problems and Responses, Courmayeur Mont Blanc, Italy, October 1996, 174.

39. Author interview with delegate attending the "Euro Atlantic Relationship: Ready for the Global Era" Wilton Park Conference, Wilton Park, United Kingdom, May 2001. See also Kornbluth, "Illegal Migration from North Africa," p. 174; International Labour Organization, "Migration from the Maghreb and Migration Pressures: Current Situation and Future Prospects" available at (<http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/migrant/papers/migmag/annex>); "Over the Sea to Spain," *The Economist*, 12 August 2000.

40. The Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla are even closer, lying just 1500 meters (less than one mile) from the Moroccan coast. However, entry to Europe via this route has largely been curtailed as a result of the erection of huge fortified walls, subsidized by the EU, to prevent unauthorized immigration.

41. Written statement submitted by Human Rights Advocates International, United Nations Social and Economic Council, 24 January 2002, available at (<http://www.unhcr.ch/Huridocda/Huridocda.nsf>). See also "Over the Sea to Spain," *The Economist*, August 12, 2000.

42. "Spain, Italy," Migration News 9(5) (May 2002), available at (http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/Archive_MN/may_2002-12mn.html).

43. Kornbluth, "Illegal Migration from North Africa," pp. 174–75; "Over the Sea to Spain," *The Economist*, 12 August 2000.

44. William Bauer, "Refugees, Victims or Killers," *International Journal* (Autumn 1997), p. 68; Margaret Beare, "Framework Paper: Illegal Migration," paper presented before the Third Meeting of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) Working Group on Transnational Crime, Manila, The Philippines, May 1998, pp. 44–46. Generally, interest charges are imposed on late payments, which can amount to as much as 10 to 20 percent a week. Effectively this means that migrants are forced to work off their debt indefinitely, which amounts to de-facto slavery.

45. Author interview with French counterterrorism officials, Paris, France, February 2001.

46. Gabreil Sheffer, "Ethno-National Diasporas and National Security," *Survival* 36(1) (1994), pp. 64–65.

47. *Ibid.*, 74.

48. See, for instance, "No Room for Afghans," *The Economist*, 13 January 2001; "A Few Bad Apples," *The Economist*, January 13, 2001; and "The Warm Embrace," *Time*, 26 June 2000.

49. Author interview with officials from the German *Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz* (BfV), Lisbon, June 2002. See also "Germany's anti-Nazi Campaign in Disarray," *The Daily Telegraph* (UK), 2 February 2002; Chalk, *Non-Military Security and Global Order*, pp. 133–134; Paul Wilkinson, "Violence, Terror and the Extreme Right," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 7(4) (1995), pp. 88–89; Jack Thompson, "Odin's Legion on the March," *The World Today* (February 2001), pp. 25–27; Kornbluth, "Illegal Migration from North Africa," p. 175; "Italy Cracks Down on Extremist Displays at Soccer Games," *The Washington Post*, 6 February 2000; and "Germany's Neo-Nazis," *The Economist*, 12 August 2000.

50. The ATT arrangements were enacted in 1950 when Pakistan, under international agreement gave landlocked Afghanistan permission to import duty-free goods through the port of Karachi. The fall of Kabul in 1992 coincided with the opening up of new markets in Central Asia for foodstuffs, fuel, and building materials, creating a potential bonanza for illegal transport syndicates and mafias.

51. Rashid, *The Taliban. Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia*, 189–195; Chalk, *Non-Military Security and Global Order*, p. 131.

52. “A Few Bad Apples,” *The Economist*, 13 January 2001.

53. “The Warm Embrace,” *Time*, 26 June 2000; “Over the Sea to Spain,” *The Economist*, 12 January 2000; Kornbluth, “Illegal Migration from North Africa,” pp. 175–176.

54. For an overview of these initiatives see Peter Chalk, “The Third Pillar on Judicial and Home Affairs Cooperation, Anti-Terrorist Collaboration and Liberal Democratic Acceptability,” in Fernando Reinares, ed., *European Democracies Against Terrorism. Governmental Policies and Intergovernmental Cooperation* (Ashgate: Dartmouth Publishing, 2001), pp. 176–182.

55. “Over the Sea to Spain,” *The Economist*, 12 August 2001.

56. International Maritime Bureau, *Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships. Annual Report, 1 January–31 December 2001* (London: ICC-International Maritime Bureau, January 2002), p. 5. Only 2000 has registered a higher number of overall attacks, with 469 recorded for the year.

57. International Maritime Bureau, *Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships. Annual Report, 1 January–31 December 2002*, p. 5; International Maritime Bureau, *Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships. Report for the Period 1 January–30 June 2002*, p. 5 (London: ICC-International Maritime Bureau, July 2002), p. 5.

58. Author interview, British maritime security sub-contractor, London, U.K., May 2001. See also Brian Scudder, “Pirate King Turns Law Enforcer,” *African Business* (July/August 2000), p. 28. It should be noted that since 2001 Munya has been engaged in on-off negotiations with authorities in Puntland that are aimed at bringing the warlord’s fleet back into the Somali fold. At the time of this writing, however, it remained unclear as to what (if any progress) had been made in these talks.

59. Scudder, “Pirate King Turns Law Enforcer,” p. 29.

60. Author interview, International Maritime Bureau, London, U.K., May 2001.

61. Author interview, British maritime security sub-contractor, London, U.K., May 2001.

62. The HART Group is a private global risk management brokerage, run by former members of the U.K. and U.S. special forces, that has been retained to assess the feasibility of establishing a multilateral Fishing Protection Authority to prevent the over-exploitation of marine resources (especially tuna) in an extended exclusive economic zone covering Mozambique, Kenya, Tanzania, Somalia, and Djibouti. It has been engaged in several surveillance missions around the Horn of Africa (taken in conjunction with a locally trained Marine Protection Force), which have brought it into direct confrontation with pirates based along the Somali coast.

63. Author interview, International Maritime Bureau, London, U.K., May 2001.

64. Roughly 5,000 vessels are thought to pass through this corridor every year, a figure that is superseded only by the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf (19,000) and the Bosphorous Straits in the Black Sea and Dardanelles Straits in the Aegean Sea (21,700). U.S. Coast Guard, *Worldwide Maritime Threat Assessment 2000* (Washington D.C.: Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center, CG-002-00, May 2000), p. I-6.

65. Samuel Menefee, *Trends in Maritime Violence. Special Report* (London: Jane’s Information Group, July 1996), p. 46.

66. Author interview, International Maritime Bureau, London, U.K., May 2001; U.S. Coast Guard, *Worldwide Maritime Threat Assessment 2000*, p. II-8.

67. Author interview, International Maritime Bureau, London, U.K., May 2001. See also Menefee, *Trends in Maritime Violence*, pp. 45, 48; and Scudder, “Pirate’s Last Stand,” pp. 171–179.

68. International Maritime Bureau, *Armed Robbery and Violence at Sea. Annual Report, 1 January–31 December 2001*, p. 10.

69. Eric Ellen, "Piracy," in Eric Ellen, ed., *Shipping at Risk—The Rising Tide of Organized Crime* (London: International Chamber of Commerce, 1997), pp. 49–50. See also Douglas Stevenson, "The Human Cost of Piracy," *Baltic International Maritime Council (BIMCO) Special Bulletin: Piracy, Stowaways and Drug Smuggling* (London: BIMCO, 1998), pp. 12–13.

70. Author interview, U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington D.C., January 2001.

71. Most phantom ships sail under Panamanian, Liberian, Belize, St. Vincent, or Honduran flags, all of which are characterized by notoriously lax registration requirements. For an interesting account of this manifestation of contemporary piracy see Jayant Abyankar, "Phantom Ships," in Ellen, ed., *Shipping at Risk—The Rising Tide of Organized Crime*, pp. 58–75.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.

74. The environmental danger emanating from piracy is increasingly being recognized as one of the main threats stemming from this particular non-military threat. See, for instance, Michael Grey, "Piracy—a Hazard of our Times," *BIMCO Bulletin* 2 (March–April 1992), p. 23; "Piracy Becomes World Threat," *The Sunday Telegraph* (U.K.), 25 May 1997; and "Terror on the High Seas," *The Australian*, 21 November 1995.

75. See for instance, U.S. Coast Guard, *Worldwide Maritime Threat Assessment 2000*, pp. I-4, I-5.

76. International Maritime Bureau, *Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships. Annual Report, 1 January—31 December 2001*, p. 22.

77. Chalk, *Non-Military Security and Global Order*, pp. 142–143.

78. See, for instance, Simon Dalby, "Security, Intelligence, the National Interest and the Global Environment," *Intelligence and National Security* 10(4) (1995), pp. 188–193; and Jim Holden-Rhodes and Peter Lupsha, "Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Gray Area Phenomena and the New World Disorder," *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement* 2(2) (1993), pp. 222–223.

79. Comments made during the Wilton Park "Euro-Atlantic Relationship: Ready for the Global Era?" Conference, Wilton Park, 21–25 May 2001. See also Dabelko and VanDeveer, "European Insecurities: Can't Live With 'Em, Can't Shoot 'Em," p. 188.

