

Terrorism and Changes in Political Party Systems

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The subject to which this essay is devoted concerns the relationship between conventional party politics and the formation of terrorist groups. Using several collections of aggregate data, this study examines the effect of changes in party politics from the 1960s to the 1970s on the appearances of terrorist groups in many nations. Changes in the number of parties in the system, fluctuations in their electoral performances and in their parliamentary representation from one decade to the other are linked to the number of terrorist groups active in different nations. A principal finding is that nations with many leftist parties have also tended to have many terrorist groups, irrespective of the latter's ideology or political outlook. The study maintains that understanding the dynamics of political party change in different nations provides insight into the origins of terrorist activity.

No long list of bibliographic references should be necessary to persuade the reader that from the late 1960s through the following decade, and continuing to the present in some places, terrorist violence has posed a serious problem to numerous governments. In some instances, for example, Argentina and Turkey, the violence was sufficiently threatening to provoke the military to intervene and end democratic rule, at least for a while. In other democracies legal protections concerning personal privacy and due process of law etc, were weakened in order to make it easier for the authorities to defeat their terrorist adversaries. In a few cases, for example, Lebanon and Sri Lanka, civil wars were either sparked or sustained by acts of terrorist violence. In the international arena, the withdrawal of Western peacekeeping forces from Lebanon in 1984 was caused by terrorist attacks, as was the US air raid on Libya two years later. And although it certainly was not *the* cause, terrorism was a cause of the Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980, the most destructive international conflict since the end of World War II.

How are we to understand these troubling developments? What meaning should we assign to them? Efforts to answer these questions have yielded a vast body of literature produced by journalists, historians, area specialists and social scientists of many kinds.¹ Their answers have ranged in scale and focus from the individual psychologies of terrorism's

practitioners to the strategies of states engaged in surrogate or low intensity warfare against their international adversaries.

Little noticed and rarely mentioned in these analyses is the possible association between terrorist groups and the structure of conventional party politics in those nations where their violent activities have been carried out.² It is precisely this theme we wish to explore here. At least at domestic level, was the advent of the modern terrorist era in the late 1960s and into the next decade accompanied by or linked to changes in the dynamics of political party competition in the affected nations? If, as we hope to show, the answer to this question is 'yes' then we may be able to shed some further light on contemporary terrorism, a political phenomenon after all.

We wish to challenge the conventional presumption that terrorist violence and political party competition are near opposite modes of political expression. Nations in which political parties reflecting different points of view are free to organize and compete for power through the electoral process should have few, if any, active terrorist groups. The latter ought to be found in circumstances where national political leaders have imposed serious restrictions on open political party organization and competition. In the absence of the ballot box, bombs and bullets become attractive alternatives. We intend to show readers that this common sense view is not supported by the evidence.

I

The data used to explore the relationship between terrorism and political party systems were derived from various sources. A few of the latter were reported in earlier work on related themes.³ Nevertheless, at this stage of our inquiry it seems both useful and necessary to provide an accounting of the data sources on which the subsequent analysis will be based.

The *World Directory of Terrorist and Other Organizations Associated with Guerrilla Warfare, Political Violence and Protest* served as our source of information on terrorist groups.⁴ This *Directory* contains more than 2000 entries, but many refer to criminal gangs, political movements, guerrilla bands and government agencies whose *modus operandi* did not appear to encompass terrorist activities. We coded information on groups if they were labelled as terrorist, urban guerrilla, or identified as a death squad. Groups whose activities included assassinations, bombings, kidnapping or skyjacking, threatened or carried out, and intended to achieve some political objective were also included.

Based on these criteria, we identified 379 terrorist organizations active from the end of World War II through the middle of 1987.⁵ We found such

groups to exist in 82 countries. Their geographic distribution was hardly even however. Some countries, for example, Brazil, Spain and Turkey, had many groups, while others, including the Dominican Republic and Nepal, had only one.

Some of the groups' attributes were coded. We were attentive to their ideological orientations. Accordingly, they were identified as either leftist (revolutionary, anarchist, Marxist, Trotskyite, Maoist, etc.), rightist (racist, neo-Fascist, neo-Nazi) or nationalist-separatist-religious (groups using terrorist violence in order to establish an independent homeland or impose their religious views on society).

Data concerning political parties and political party system characteristics were drawn from two sources. We used one collection, *Political Parties of The World*, to record rudimentary information on all parties extant in about 1980.⁶ Among other things, we coded the number of political parties active in all the independent nations of the world, along with their ideological orientations, irrespective of their electoral performance. Thus small parties unable to win seats in a national parliament appear along with strong parties with substantial legislative representation.

The electoral data were taken from the *Europa Year Book*, which publishes annually a description of each of the world's countries' political systems.⁷ This description includes the outcome of elections, if held, in a specific nation. From these we were able to determine three basic measures – the number of parties winning votes in an election (and the parties' ideological direction); the percentage of votes won by each party, and thus by types of parties; and number of parliamentary seats, if any, won by parties, categorized by ideology.

Another source used in earlier analyses *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* contains, among others, a measure of electoral turnout for each nation in the study.⁸ This measure is recorded for one election each during 1959–69 and 1970–79.⁹ When the *Europa* data were drawn, we took the election closest to the year that the turnout data were reported in the *World Handbook*. Therefore, we have electoral data for all countries having an election in either the 1960s or the 1970s. In those countries that conducted elections in both decades, we can make comparisons about the changes in the party systems, who won and lost, how popular one party was, who was represented and how that changed.¹⁰ As a consequence we have three measures of political change: change in the number of parties winning votes; change in the percentage of the vote won by parties; and the change in the magnitude of parliamentary representation from one decade to the next. These measures were then characterized as representing an increase, a decrease or no change –

stability – over this roughly 20-year period. Given these measures we ask how terrorist groups respond to party political change.

The array of information at our disposal for examining the interplay between terrorism and party politics certainly has its limitations in terms of precision and so on. Nonetheless, in our view it represents a formidable collection of data concerning the attributes of political party systems around the world during the 1960s and 1970s, when many major terrorist campaigns were mounted and waged.

II

Terrorist groups differ from one another in various ways. In this inquiry we are able to report two bases of differentiation: political orientation and geographic location.

TABLE 1

TERRORIST GROUP POLITICAL DIRECTION

Political Direction	N	%
Left	154	40.6
National/Religious	122	32.2
Right	93	24.5
Other	10	2.6
Total	379	100.0

In terms of their political direction or ideological bent (see Table 1), the cause of leftist revolution was the most common source of inspiration for terrorist groups. Nevertheless, less than a majority (40.6 per cent) of groups were of this mind. Taken together, nationalist-separatist-religious and right-wing formations outnumbered the revolutionary factions by a substantial margin.

Those familiar with the terrorist groups' activities over the last two decades will not be astonished by our report of their geographic location. Europe, meaning largely Western Europe, was their most common venue, followed by Latin America and the Middle East. Sub-Saharan Africa, North America, the Far East and South Asia, though not regions free of political strife and violence, were not homes to many terrorist groups.

When we begin to relate our collection of terrorist groups to the characteristics of the political party systems involved some interesting patterns surface. For one thing, there is an obvious relationship between political parties and terrorist groups. The two phenomena go together

(see Table 2). Using the *Political Parties of The World* data, it seems clear that nations in which there were many political parties (about 1980) also had a higher number of terrorist groups. The latter were relatively scarce in countries without visible political parties and in one party systems. An appropriate question to ask ourselves here is whether the propensity of terrorist groups to congregate in nations with many political parties is affected by the ideological orientation of the parties involved?

TABLE 2
NUMBER OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND TERRORIST GROUPS

	N	%
No parties	46	12.1
1 party	17	4.5
2-8 parties	85	22.4
9-15 parties	82	21.6
16 or more parties	149	39.3
Total	379	100.00

The central tendency (see Table 3) is for terrorist groups, whatever their ideological bent, to appear in nations with multiple leftist parties. No such pattern exists for other types of parties.

TABLE 3
POLITICAL ORIENTATION AND PARTY STRUCTURE

	Total		Leftist		Rightist		Centrist		Separatist	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
No parties	46	12.1	57	15	140	36.9	117	30.9	140	36.9
1 party	17	3.7	24	6.3	32	8.4	64	16.9	46	12.1
2-8 parties	85	22.4	232	61.2	176	46.5	186	49.1	112	29.6
9-15 parties	82	21.6	22	5.8	31	8.2	2	0.5	72	19.0
16 or more parties	149	39.3	44	11.6	-	-	10	2.6	9	2.4

While it would be an understatement to say that generalizing from the fragmentary evidence reported above would be premature, these frequency distributions at least should alert us that party rich environments, those rich in Left parties in particular, also provide terrorist groups with opportunities to organize themselves.

To this point though we have not made an effort to evaluate the electoral support of the parties involved, nor have we taken into consideration the element of change. Fortunately the data we recorded

from the *Europa Year Book* permits us to take both factors into consideration. As noted earlier, they allow us to measure changes in election outcomes from the 1960s to the 1970s overall and in respect of the relative successes and failures of different types of political parties in this period.

Despite the shift in focus, the first finding we have is consistent with the observations we made based on the *Political Parties of The World* collection. That is, a majority of terrorist groups appear in nations where the total number of parties winning votes increased from the 1960s to the 1970s (see Table 4). The more political parties winning votes, the more terrorist groups are to be found.

TABLE 4
CHANGES IN PARTIES WINNING VOTES

	N	%
Increase	142	58.6
No change	57	23.6
Decrease	43	17.8
Total	242	100.00

Missing cases 137; 36.1% of total

In light of this general observation, we would also like to know if the political direction of the parties involved is associated with the distribution of the terrorist groups. In this regard, the political parties whose performances are reported in the *Europa Year Book* were classified along the following lines: Left, Right, Center, nationalist, religious and regionalist. Besides the change in the number of parties winning votes from the 1960s to the 1970s, we can report differences in the percentage of the vote received by the various families of parties and the increases or decreases in their seats in parliament.

It makes sense, initially, to pay attention to changes in vote distribution. An obvious question here is whether or not the appearance of terrorist groups is associated with increasing electoral change? For example, do we find a high proportion of terrorist groups in nations where there has been a decline in voter support for parties of the Center? If so, the inference would be that electorates were becoming polarized and that, further, the presence of numerous terrorist groups reflected this development.

The weight of the evidence (see Table 5) though does not support the above contention. In fact, the overall pattern is to find terrorist groups in countries where electoral stability not volatility has been the dominant

TABLE 5
CHANGE OF VOTE

	Right	Left	Center	Nationalist	Regionalist	Religious
Increase	23 (9.6)*	82 (34.2)	54 (22.5)	36 (15.0)	—	—
No change	193 (80.4)	144 (60.0)	149 (39.3)	204 (85.0)	240 (100.0)	232 (96.9)
Decrease	24 (10.0)	14 (5.8)	37 (9.8)	—	—	8 (3.3)
Missing	139 (36.7)	139 (36.7)	139 (36.7)	139 (36.7)	139 (36.7)	139 (36.7)

*Per cent based on non-missing cases

characteristic. In each case, at least 60 per cent of the terrorist groups are found in countries with no substantial change, up or down, in popular vote preferences from the 1960s to the 1970s. As for the political Center, more than 84 per cent of the terrorist groups in our collection are to be found in nations where voter support for Center parties had either remained the same or increased over the two decades.

TABLE 6
CHANGE IN NUMBER OF SEATS

	Right	Left	Center	Nationalist	Regionalist	Religious
Increase	112 (46.7)*	165 (67.6)	101 (41.9)	45 (18.8)	3 (0.8)	—
No change	76 (31.7)	38 (15.6)	51 (21.2)	156 (65.0)	237 (98.7)	32 (13.7)
Decrease	52 (21.7)	41 (16.8)	89 (36.9)	39 (16.2)	—	208 (54.9)
Missing	139 (36.7)	135 (35.6)	139 (36.7)	139 (36.7)	139 (36.7)	139 (36.7)

*Per cent based on non-missing cases

On the whole, and with one dramatic exception, the same picture emerges when we look at changes in the number of political parties *within* each ideological family that won votes. At least 60 per cent of the terrorist groups were found in nations where Center parties as well as

those of a nationalist, regional or religious bent neither increased nor decreased in number based on their ability to attract voter support (see Table 6). Right-wing parties are a bit different however. While it is true that the most common location of terrorist groups is in countries where there was no significant change in the number of rightist parties winning votes, it is still less than a majority of the total. In this instance a relatively high percentage of the terrorist groups, slightly more than 40 per cent, were located in nations where the number of rightist parties winning votes had actually increased. Interesting though this observation may be, it is the Left that provides us with the most striking deviation from the norm. More than 60 per cent of the terrorist groups were in nations where the number of left-wing parties winning votes had increased from the 1960s to the 1970s.

The general finding that terrorist groups were found most commonly where there had been a decade-to-decade increase in the number of political parties winning votes must now be qualified. The effect was found not with parties in general, but leftist ones in particular (with some contribution from the right). An effort to assign some broad meaning to these observations seems premature. We prefer to review changes in the distribution of parliamentary seats to the various parties before attempting to generalize on factors which may be at work here.

TABLE 7
CHANGE IN NUMBER OF PARTIES WINNING VOTES

	Right	Left	Center	Nationalist	Regionalist	Religious
Increase	97 (40.4)*	150 (61.5)	48 (19.9)	45 (18.8)	1 (0.8)	6 (5.8)
No change	110 (45.8)	66 (27.0)	149 (61.8)	174 (72.5)	237 (98.7)	212 (55.9)
Decrease	33 (13.7)	28 (7.4)	44 (18.3)	21 (8.8)	—	22 (5.8)
Missing	139 (36.7)	135 (35.6)	138 (36.4)	139 (36.7)	139 (36.7)	139 (36.7)

*Per cent based on non-missing cases

In looking at the relationship between the distribution of terrorist groups and changes in the parliamentary representation of political parties in the period with which we are concerned, the picture that appears (see Table 7) is relatively complicated. Overall there is substantially more change to be found here than was the case for political

party electoral performances and most certainly for the change in percentage vote results. The greater magnitude of change in parliamentary seats itself may come from various changes in the rules of the game among the political systems included in our analysis. However, if we pay attention to the central tendency at work, the outcome is not dramatically different from our earlier findings. Like them, the presence of terrorist groups is linked to the expansion of the Left and Right. Nearly a majority of terrorist groups were located in nations where right-wing representation had increased from the 1960s to the 1970s. On the left the proportion is greater still. More than *two-thirds* of the terrorist groups were in nations where the number of parliamentary seats won by leftist candidates had increased.

Some attempt at generalizing on these findings now seems warranted. Discussions about the sources of terrorist behavior found in professional literature often emphasize the elitist nature of the phenomenon.¹¹ Terrorist violence is the outcome of decisions made by small groups of individuals frustrated by their inability to mobilize the masses, etc., is an observation anyone familiar with the literature will recognize immediately. Our findings tend to support this view but within limits.

In terms of voting, what appears to have happened is a greater *fragmentation* of the electorate in that we find terrorist groups in situations where voters in the 1970s were willing to cast their ballots for a larger *number* of left- and right-wing parties than in elections held over the previous decade. The connection between this pattern and terrorism may be related to a process familiar to many student of party competition. If we assume terrorism to be a form of political extremism, in this context it may well be the outcome of a bidding process. Left and right groups, parties and various other sorts of political organizations compete with one another to win the support of roughly the same segment of the population. In this crowded setting the various competitors seek to outbid each other in seeking popular support. Terrorism and terrorist organizations may emerge as *a* or *the* most radical bid by the various groups in competition with one another.

An authentic curiosity we have reported concerns the prevalence of terrorist groups in nations where left and right-wing parties actually increased their strength in parliament. Common sense tells us that the opposite should be the case: terrorism should be linked to a frustrating decline in power not an increasing parliamentary presence.

The same may be said in connection with the increasing number of left and right-wing parties winning votes at elections held during the 1970s. The more of these parties winning votes, the greater the number of terrorist groups. Once again increasing Left party success and terrorism

appear to go together. How is this result to be explained? One potential explanation for the linkage between political success and the appearance of terrorist groups involves the issue of compromise. In order to increase their representation in parliament, parties on both Left and Right may have had to compromise their ideologies or adjust to the political realities of the day. The effect of doing this may have been to antagonize more extreme elements in each camp, who regarded this behavior as a betrayal of fundamental principles. Thus the price of success may have been the increasing estrangement and resort to violence of those who found an 'historic compromise' or accommodation to the system to be intolerable.

Another possible explanation for these ostensibly paradoxical findings may lie in a gap between the total numbers of parties and the total number of parties receiving votes. What we have reported to this point is a growing number of left and right parties in the 1970s winning votes as compared to the 1960s. We have not discussed success or failure relative to the total number of parties in the system. The *Political Parties of The World* collection provides us with an opportunity to make such a comparison. Because it contains totals for the number of parties extant in about 1980 irrespective of their electoral success or failure, hypothetically, the number of parties winning votes could increase but there could also remain a large difference between the parties winning votes, and the overall number of parties, in about 1980. What such a phenomenon would indicate is roughly a decrease in the number of parties winning votes, relative to the number of parties, accompanied by an increase in the number of parties winning votes, from the 1960s to 1970s which can be interpreted as the consolidation of that family of parties in the electorate. That is, stability of the party system, or some segment of it, say the left, would be reached. There would be fewer peripheral or nominal parties appealing to some portion of the ideological spectrum too narrow to achieve electoral success. Within this system, or family of parties, there could be more parties winning, for with the passage of time, stable *intrafamilia* differences would arise, and reflect themselves in more winning parties.¹²

In the opposite circumstance, an increase in the number of parties from one decade to another, and a decrease in the number of parties winning votes, could be interpreted as a breaking up, or destabilization of electoral appeal and a proliferation of *intrafamilia* parties or groups, narrowly based, trying to find the popular chord to which the voters might respond.

In short, the former would be associated with increasingly popular dominant and conventional appeals while the latter would represent unpopular minority, unconventional or unaccepted political ideas.

Circumstances with an increase in the number of parties winning votes, approaching the total number of parties in the system, and an increase in the number of parties winning votes, from the 1960s to 1970s would be an example of a highly fractured party and electoral system; a system characterized by a high degree of diversity, which may have become institutionalized by the rules of the game. Such a system could be 'unstable' and volatile. Finally, a decrease in the number of parties, relative to the total, and a decrease in the number of winning parties is indicative of an increasingly monochrome system, possibly stagnant, and almost certainly tending to a single, or non-party system.

Accordingly, we compared the differences between the total number of parties winning votes in the 1960s, the total number of parties winning votes in the 1970s with the total number of parties in existence about 1980. The result of this calculation is shown in Table 8. The evidence displayed in this suggests an increase in the success rate of parties in the 1970s over their performances in the earlier decade.

TABLE 8
DIFFERENCE IN PARTIES 1960-1980 and 1970-1980

	1960 to 1980		1970 to 1980	
	N	%	N	%
More	41	15.1	9	3.1
The same	4	1.5	7	2.4
Fewer	277	83.5	270	94.4
Missing	107	28.2	93	24.5

*Per cent based on non-missing cases

That is, a higher proportion of parties won votes in the 1970s than the 1960s. On the other hand, when we perform the same calculation only for left-wing parties (also see Table 8), the results are the opposite. In this instance leftist parties were dramatically *less* successful in winning votes more recently. (This was not the case with rightist parties however. Their performance mirrored that of parties in general.) We now have some further handle on the 'success' of the Left and the appearance of multiple terrorist groups.

Irrespective of their own ideological direction, terrorist groups congregate in situations where leftist *parties* are numerous and where they seemingly experienced advances in their performances in the 1970s over the 1960s both in terms of legislative presence and the number of

winning votes. But the latter observation should be qualified. Evidently, for the countries included in our analysis, political conditions were such as to promote the formation of leftist parties at such a rapid pace that their success rate, relative to their total numbers in about 1980, actually declined.

With regard to the meaning of these findings we should keep a few things in mind. First, terrorist groups are not mass movements. It only takes a relative handful of individuals to commence hostilities. The appearance of left-wing terrorist groups may be associated with contexts where there is an increase at the activist or elite level in various forms of left-wing political activity. Some extremist groups trying their hand at party politics may turn towards violence when their electoral appeals go unheeded. Second, the appearance of other types of terrorist groups, rightist ones – death squads, neo-Fascist and neo-Nazi in particular – may occur in reaction to the enhanced levels of leftist activity either peaceful or violent but activity that will appear quite threatening to some elements in society.

The sensitivity of the terrorist groups to the performance of left-wing political parties made us suspect that there may also be something about leftist doctrine or ideology that influences the relationship between terrorist groups and the party system. To explore this possibility we segregated the terrorist groups by their political direction – Left, Right, separatist-nationalist-religious – and calculated frequency distributions for each. That is, each type of terrorist group was distributed by the various kinds of political party changes already discussed. In this way, we paid attention to the political direction of the terrorist groups rather than or in addition to that of the parties.

TABLE 9
LEFT AND NON-LEFT PARTY PERFORMANCE

	Left			Non-left		
	Parties	Seats	% Votes	Parties	Seats	% Votes
Increase	74* (60.2)	79 (64.2)	37 (30.6)	76 (62.8)	86 (71.1)	45 (37.8)
No change	33 (26.8)	19 (15.4)	79 (65.3)	33 (27.3)	19 (15.7)	65 (21.6)
Decrease	16 (13.0)	25 (20.3)	5 (4.1)	12 (9.9)	16 (13.2)	9 (7.6)
Missing	31 (20.1)	31 (20.1)	33 (21.4)	104 (46.2)	104 (46.2)	106 (47.1)

*Per cent based on non-missing cases

As may be seen in Table 9, when we look at the distribution of leftist terrorist groups, in terms of the several measures of decade to decade political party change, it appears to be almost indistinguishable from the distribution of terrorist groups in general. About the same may be said about the two other distributions as well. The frequency distribution for right-wing terrorist groups as well as that for nationalist/separatist and religious ones do not look substantially different from the overall pattern. Thus, it follows that whatever impact changes in left-wing party politics has on the appearance of political terrorism in different nations it is felt about equally by all the groups not simply the leftist ones.

III

Our findings have been expressed in relatively abstract terms. Instead of discussing one specific country or party system, we have sought to understand what is generally the case. In using this research strategy we have been able to observe a tendency for terrorist groups of all kinds to appear in contexts where there appeared to be an intensification of left-wing party politics. Why should this have been the case? If we think in causal terms, it would seem logical that terrorist organizations would have appeared in nations where party politics was becoming polarized. But this did not prove to be true. Instead, our findings emphasize the importance of the leftist experience.

Here it makes some sense to believe that a strong force promoting the development of terrorist bands had to do with conflicts *within* the family of left-wing political parties and related groups. Conflict among the latter for the support of the same sector of public opinion may have set in motion a dynamic process leading to the articulation of progressively more extreme solutions. For some contestants in this intra-left struggle terrorist violence likely became an attractive alternative. Non-left terrorist groups, rightist ones, such as death squads and neo-Fascist bands, seem likely to have mobilized in response to or in reaction against these developments.

When we descend from the realm of social science generalization to recall the specific political environment of the late 1960s, our abstract findings take on a clear flesh and blood form. In much of Europe and Latin America it was an era during which there was enormous ferment on the left. Followers of Mao, Castro, Trotsky and New Leftists of diverse ideological inspiration, emerged to challenge the more conventional and established parties of the Left, pro-Soviet Communist in particular. Our findings seem to have captured these developments and pursued some of their consequences.¹³

From an American perspective it seems hard to imagine some linkage between how the Democratic and Republican parties behave internally or towards one another and the emergence of the Symbionese Liberation Army or other tiny and ephemeral terrorist groups. But viewed from other parts of the globe, particularly where the distinction between party politics and politically inspired violence is not all that sharp (e.g., Latin America), our findings should hardly come as a surprise.

The results, to repeat, point to the fact that the more crowded with contestants the political space on the Left of the party system becomes, the more numerous the presence of terrorist groups. And, more generally, it seems clear now that in the long list of ways in which parties make a difference we may now add the appearance of terrorist organizations.

NOTES

1. One widely used bibliography on terrorism runs to more than 200 pages. See Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman *et al.*, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature* (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing, 1988) pp.241-445.
2. For some discussion see Leonard Weinberg, 'Turning To Terror: The Conditions Under Which Political Enemies Turn to Terrorist Activities' *Comparative Politics* 23/3 (July 1991), pp.423-38.
3. See Leonard Weinberg and William Eubank, 'Political Parties and the Formation of Terrorist Groups', *Terrorism and Political Violence* 2/2 (Summer 1990), pp.125-44.
4. For a more detailed account of the processes of which the terrorist groups are identified and coded see *Ibid.*, pp.133-4.
5. We should note that an unknown number of these groups expired prior to the 1960s-70s period which we address. Certainly some were involved in the decolonizing movements of the post World War II era. As such, some, a small minority, of the terrorist groups in our data are not temporally in the 1960s-70s and contribute some small bias to the results. However, the vast majority of the terrorist groups arose and flourished during what Walter Laqueur called the 'Age of Terrorism', and many still exist. Thus we are confident that the analyses that followed do not constitute error or an empirical *non-sequitur*. More fundamentally the topic we pursue, terrorism is a form of political behavior to obtain a specific end. Those who practice terror, the individuals and their organizations, are embedded as are the electoral systems we described, in the social, political, cultural, and economic conditions and how those conditions changed from the 1970s and vice versa. These changes, or the life cycle of an individual terrorist group, takes place within the context of the changes in the system we describe, in this case the electoral system. What we report is a summary of these changes.
6. Allen Day and Henry Degenhardt (eds.), *Political Parties of The World* (London: Longman Group, 1980).
7. *Europa Year Book* (London: Europa Publications, 1959-to present).
8. Charles Taylor and David Jodice, *World Handbook of Political And Social Indicators*, Vol.182, 3rd ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1983).
9. The turnout measure is not used in the analysis presented in this paper.
10. It should be noted that not all countries had elections either decade, and the analysis is based on terrorist groups found only in those countries with elections in both decades.
11. E.g., Richard Rubenstein, *Alchemist of Revolution* (NY: Basic Books, 1987), pp.65-85.

12. This formulation should not come as a surprise. Students of electoral systems argue that this could be a by-product of the rules of the electoral game, with the opportunity to form 'splinter parties': increased in proportional representation systems, particularly those with low minimum winning vote. In single member plurality systems, these differences would be factions within a standing party, such as the difference in the American Democratic Party. See, e.g. Rae, Grofman & Lijphardt, Lijphardt.
13. For the New Left on world basis during the late 1960s, see George Katsiaficas, *The Imagination of The New Left: A Global Analysis of 1968* (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1987), pp.29–82.