

The Social and Religious Characteristics of Suicide Bombers and Their Victims

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Using data collected by the National Security Studies Center at the University of Haifa, the authors provide social profiles of Palestinian suicide bombers and their largely Israeli victims. In addition, drawing on a series of public opinion polls, the writers describe the reactions of Israeli citizens to the wave of suicide bombings the country has experienced since the beginning of the Al Aqsa intifada in the second half of 2000.

Introduction

In this article we are concerned with the phenomenon of suicide bombing in the context of the apparently endless and perhaps existential conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. In particular we intend to discuss three topics: 1) who the suicide bombers are and why, we suspect, they do it; 2) who the victims of these attacks are and how representative of the Israeli population they may be; and 3) what impact these exceptionally attention-winning events have had on the Israeli public to whom they appear to be addressed. Before undertaking this enterprise, it seems advisable to define our terms. In particular, what do we mean when we refer to 'suicide-bombing'? Also, in order to provide readers with some perspective on this dramatic and lethal form of terrorism, we begin by offering a brief account of the recent history of suicide bombing in the Middle East and elsewhere.¹

Suicide bombings seem quintessentially to be terrorist acts. But contrary to other terrorist attacks, the suicide bombing is 'an operational method in which the very act of the attack is dependent upon the death of the perpetrator'.² As we have come to understand this 'operational method', most suicide attacks are carried out through activating explosives carried on the terrorist's body in the form of a portable explosive charge, or planted in a vehicle driven by the terrorist himself or, on occasion, herself. The suicide terrorist essentially becomes a 'human time bomb'. He/she selects the time and place to set off the explosion in order to cause the most death and destruction.

Because of its current prevalence, this description equates suicide bombing with suicide terrorism. In reality, the former is really a subspecies of the latter. Over the last several decades, a number of groups, most notably Ahmed Jibril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), have sent members on missions that could only be completed if these individuals killed themselves or allowed themselves to be killed in the course of their execution. No bombings were involved.³ On the other side of the ledger, Ariel Merari cites a number of instances from the Lebanese experience where handlers tricked the 'suicide bomber' into killing himself by telling the perpetrator that the mission could be carried out without the necessity of his death.⁴ Unlike most cases, the bomber's death was not suicidal, in the sense of it being a voluntary act.

Suicide Bombing: Sacred and Secular

Modern suicide bombings began in Lebanon in 1983 and were first carried out by an organization that became known as *Hizballah* (or 'party of God'). Drawn from the country's Shiite population, *Hizballah* derived its inspiration (along with more tangible benefits) from the Iranian revolutionaries. They were inspired by the behavior of 14- and 15-year-old children, the so-called '*Basij*' or 'mobilized', who walked through mine fields ahead of the regular Iranian military forces during the early stages of the Iran–Iraq war (the March 1982 Operation 'Fath' or 'Victory' in particular). The children deliberately set off the mines, thereby killing themselves, in order to ease the army's advance. They believed or were told that their deaths, fictively on the way to Jerusalem, would gain them immediate entry into Paradise.⁵

Given these origins, it is easy to believe the current practice of suicide bombing is an exclusively religious undertaking. But this is not the case or not completely the case.⁶ If we consider the number of such attacks between 1983 and the end of 2000, it turns out that the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), a nominally Marxist organization, was responsible for 21 of the total of 286. Further, the 'Black Tigers' of the LTTE in Sri Lanka accounted for 171 suicide bombings, the largest of any single organization involved. A combination of ethnic (Tamil) and religious (Hindu) motives drives the LTTE's cause.⁷ And at the time of writing (March 2003), an officer in the Iraqi military (the Baathist regime was a largely secular one party dictatorship) carried out a suicide bombing of a US Marine post in the fighting south of Baghdad.

In the Palestinian case, about 8 per cent of the suicide bombings have been the work of unaffiliated freelancers and individuals belonging to

secular groups, largely nationalist in the case of Fatah's Al Aqsa Martyr's Brigade and leftist in the case of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), both belonging at one time or another under the PLO umbrella.⁸

Certainly it would be hard to deny that in the Palestinian–Israeli conflict a substantial majority of suicide bombings have been the work of *shahids* or religious self-martyrs belonging to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, two organizations expressing Islamist ideas about the nature of the situation.⁹ Or, to be a little more precise, in the period between July 2001 and February 2002, the peak period so far in the suicide bombing campaign against Israeli targets, over 80 per cent of the attacks were conducted by individuals sent by one or the other of these organizations.

A Perspective

Suicide bombing attacks perpetrated by Palestinians against Israelis or Israeli targets date from April 1993, when a member of Hamas parked a car loaded with explosives between two buses in front of a restaurant near Mechola in the Jordan Valley, and set-off an explosion while remaining in the car. From that time forward, with peaks and valleys, suicide bomber attacks have become an important part of the repertoire of techniques Palestinian organizations have employed in their asymmetrical struggle with Israel.¹⁰ According to a data base assembled by the National Security Studies Center at the University of Haifa, between 1993 and February 2000, only about 10 per cent of the total of (53 of the 738) terrorist attacks carried out against Israeli targets were successful suicide bombings. However, since the beginning of the second or Al Aqsa *intifada* that broke out later in 2000, the proportion of suicide bombings relative to other types of attacks has grown significantly and they have become more lethal (see appendix 1).¹¹

As a weapon, it is difficult to deny the benefits of the suicide bomb attacks. Aside from their psychological impact on both Israelis and Palestinians, the attacks have narrowed the ratio of fatalities between the two groups. According to the Washington Post, '...in the six years of the first *intifada*... 1,162 Palestinians died, compared to 174 Israelis. That is, about 6.7 Palestinians to every Israeli death. And in the first six months of this uprising (the Al Aqsa *intifada*), the ratio was roughly the same: 5:1 Palestinians died to every Israeli... But after suicide bombers began regular attacks in March 2001, the statistics swung dramatically. In the last six months, 298 Palestinians and 177 Israelis have died, a ratio of 1.7 Palestinian deaths to every Israeli death'.¹² In addition to the numbers, the attacks perpetrated by Hamas and Islamic Jihad *shahids* helped derail the peace negotiations between the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli

government headed by Shimon Peres following the 1995 assassination of Itzhak Rabin, and likely contributed to Peres' defeat at the polls some months later. In short, from a variety of perspectives, we are dealing with a potent terrorist weapon.

The Perpetrators

Who are the Palestinian suicide bombers? And why do they do it? The effort to answer these two questions has stimulated an extensive body of commentary. Some of the accounts have focused on the development of a psychological profile of the bombers. Others have investigated their *modus operandi* and the organizational framework from which these individuals have emerged. Other analysts have paid close attention to the video recordings the suicide bombers often prepare before undertaking their destructive journeys. (Since the suicide bombers often employ prepared scripts in these sessions, their accuracy, in terms of how the *shahids* really feel, may not be as unquestionable as they would appear.)¹³ For our part, we adopt a social or sociological approach in answering both the 'who' and 'why' questions.

More specifically, we employed the database developed by the National Security Studies Center at the University of Haifa to compare the social backgrounds of 80 suicide bombers with those of 743 Palestinians interred in Israeli prisons for having successfully committed other terrorist acts over the same period, April 1993 through February 2002. In other words, we compared the suicide bombers with a population of other individuals to whom it seems reasonable to believe they would bear considerable resemblance. How then do the suicides differ from methods of other terrorists active at about the same time and same context?

The first finding that attracts our attention immediately concerns previous involvement in terrorist or other violent activities. A substantially higher percentage of the *shahids* had previous experiences in the use of violence than jailed Palestinian terrorists. In general, they were not newcomers to the armed struggle against Israel. Also, we discover that the suicide bombers on average were somewhat older than the other Palestinians engaged in terrorism. The picture then is somewhat different from the one often presented in the mass media, a picture of a naïve young man, frequently a teenager, who decides to become a suicide bomber after listening to a fiery sermon by a charismatic *imam*.

Our evidence suggests instead that the suicide bombers, more often than not, have gone through a 'career' in violence before embarking on their final and most dramatic acts of terrorism. On reflection, this finding seems consistent with other understandings of the phenomenon. We cannot be

certain, but it at least seems reasonable to believe that the suicide bombers or their friends and relatives had previous experiences with the Israeli authorities, which prompted a desire to wreak vengeance. Suicide bombing is, of course, the ultimate act of vengeance. Also, but more generally, the perception of suicide bombers as veterans of armed struggle is consistent with findings about terrorists in other countries, such as in Europe and Latin America, where involvement in violence tends to escalate the longer one is engaged in it.¹⁴

Other results were more expected. While 40 per cent of the general terrorist population was married, less than 16 per cent of the suicide bombers had been married, despite the fact the latter were slightly older. And, in both cases, we are dealing with overwhelmingly male terrorists. There are differences, however, with regard to religious education and socio-economic status, the latter at least by inference. The suicide-bombers were far more likely to have received a religious education (over 82 per cent versus slightly more than 36 per cent for the conventional terrorists). Concomitantly, the suicide-bombers were drawn largely, though by no means exclusively, from the two major Islamist groups: Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Furthermore, as a matter of central tendency, more suicide-bombers came from poorer areas (such as the refugee camps) of the West Bank and Gaza Strip than the imprisoned terrorists.

The profile of the suicide bombers that emerges from this statistical investigation are of somewhat older, single young men from relatively impoverished backgrounds whose earlier life experiences had been shaped by both a religious education (one which likely stressed the values of community and self-sacrifice) and previous involvements in political violence as both perpetrators and then subjects of response by the Israeli authorities (see Appendix 2). This judgment leads us to make a few general comments about motivation based upon the work of Emile Durkheim.¹⁵

Using Durkheim's framework, designed to understand the social roots of suicide, we think we are dealing with a combination of 'altruistic' and 'fatalistic' types of suicide. From the 'altruistic' perspective, the atmosphere in the Gaza Strip and on the West Bank is such that a would-be martyr's decision to embark on a suicide bombing attack is reinforced by the community's support involving the recognition that he is sacrificing himself on behalf of the Palestinians' long-term best interests. This is especially true in a society where 'honor' is regarded among the highest virtues. In addition, once selected for an 'operation', the *shahid* is surrounded by a team of Hamas or Islamic Jihad handlers who not only provide the necessary instruction, but also insulate him from any potential conflicting pressures which might weaken his resolve.

But we also believe that a sense of fatalism is at work, given the suicide-bombers' social backgrounds and the political conditions under which they

live. Acts of fatalistic suicide characterize situations of hopelessness that result, in turn, from continuous economic and political oppression.¹⁶ The evidence indicates that suicide-bombers' life chances are severely constricted; they tend to be poor, with limited educations, and unmarried. They live either under the political control of an Israeli occupation or the corruption-ridden Palestinian Authority. Under these circumstances, the prospect of entering paradise immediately after pushing the button to detonate the explosion may come to seem a way out of a hopeless situation. It is interesting to speculate about the September 11 suicide bombers, many of which came from prosperous families and were receiving university-level education. In these cases, Durkheim's concept of 'anomic' suicide would seem to have played an important role especially for those living in Western cities such as Hamburg and London. Rather than oppression, an overdose of freedom may have been a significant factor. This may be speculation, but altruism would seem to be the one constant.

The Victims

The people killed in the suicide bombings are a far more heterogeneous group than their murderers. Nevertheless, the victims are hardly a representative cross-section of the Israeli population – despite the seemingly random nature of the attacks. Since the goal of most suicide-bombings is to kill as many Jews as possible, this fact influences the choice of locations where the attacks are carried out. Public places such as buses, bus stations, bus stops, shopping malls and popular restaurants have been among the bombers' favorite destinations. (For instance, two bus routes in Jerusalem have been hit repeatedly.) Israelis who travel in private automobiles, dine at home or at small, upscale restaurants stand a much better chance of avoiding the *shahids* than those whose daily lives require frequent exposure to public places.

As a result of this situational bias, the victims of suicide bombings have tended to be people located towards the lower end of the socio-economic ladder or elementary or high school students. In fact, because they often need to take public transportation on their way to and from school, about 23 per cent of the victims have been pupils or students. Retirees, often because of their same dependence on public transportation, have also been killed. Over 12 per cent of the *shahids*' victims have been retired people. Almost exactly a third of those killed in the suicide bombings have been workers of one type or another: clerks, skilled workers, household cleaning personnel and foreign workers (the latter usually refers to persons from Eastern Europe or Sub-Saharan Africa who have come to Israel as 'guest workers' comparable to others from poor countries who find low-paying jobs in the

wealthy nations of Western Europe and the Persian Gulf). Few of the foreign workers were Jewish.

It is true that in the vast preponderance of the cases (about 94 per cent of the casualties) the suicide bombers succeeded in hitting their targets – that is, Jews – but 6 per cent of those killed were Muslims (including Bedouins), Christians and Druze. On the other side of the ledger, slightly over 20 per cent of the *shahids*' victims were Israeli military personnel, presumably the kind of target that the militant Islamist organizations that sent them on their missions would most wish to see killed (see Appendix 3). (Israeli Defense Forces' spokespersons recently disclosed to reporters their estimate that about 18 per cent of the individuals killed in retaliation for the suicide attacks have been innocent Palestinian bystanders. There seems to be a truly devilish parity between accident and intent present in these numbers.)

The suicide bombings have been carried out for religious and political reasons. But if we consider the social backgrounds of both perpetrators and victims for a moment we are compelled to confront an irony. The *shahids* and the people they killed tended to be drawn largely from the lower strata of their respective societies. The killers and the people they killed perhaps had more in common with each other than either recognized at the moment of their confrontation.

Public Reactions

Among the Palestinian public, the suicide bombing attacks have seemingly been met with widespread approval. In Gaza and some communities on the West Bank, rewards of candy (sweets) have been distributed in celebration of particularly lethal attacks. The families of suicide bombers have come forward to say, in public at least, how much they admired their children's decisions. The level of support reflected in public opinion polls has varied with time and circumstance, but usually indicate that a large majority of Palestinians endorse the practice.

What about the reaction of the Israeli public to the killings? It is this public which, after all, are the principal audience for the suicide bombings. Available evidence was taken from nationwide opinion surveys conducted on a semi-annual basis by the National Security Studies Center's (University of Haifa) Resiliency Project. The surveys reported below run from October 2000 through October 2002 (five in all).¹⁷

A few preliminary observations are in order. First, some observers have compared the Palestinian suicide attacks against Israeli civilians to the suicide missions carried out by Japanese kamikaze pilots during the latter phases of World War II in the Pacific. The kamikaze attacks were used most

extensively against US Naval forces supporting the American invasion of Okinawa in April 1945.

The comparison is not completely accurate, since the Japanese directed their attacks against their enemies' armed forces rather than civilians. In a sense though, the comparison does have some relevance to the present conflict between the Palestinians and Israel. The devastation wrought by the kamikaze pilots, as well as the intense Japanese resistance on Okinawa, led to the Truman Administration's decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. Rather than face a repeat of Okinawa in attacking the Japanese home islands, Truman decided to use overwhelming force in order to impress upon the Japanese the futility of continuing the fight. Although the scale is vastly different, the Israeli Sharon government's decision to re-occupy the major towns in the West Bank following a series of exceptionally lethal suicide bombings in Israel in March 2002 bears some resemblance to the action taken by the American government in the summer of 1945.

A second point of comparison concerns expressions by leaders of Hamas and Islamic Jihad about the logic of suicide bombing missions. These expressions often make a comparison between the *shahids'* operations and other techniques for waging war. The argument goes as follows: The Israelis have the most advanced weapons, particularly helicopters and fighter planes, with which to wage war against the Palestinian population. We, on the other hand, have meager means with which to strike back at the enemy. So the suicide bombers become the Palestinian equivalent of bombing campaigns waged from the air by nations with greater military prowess.¹⁸

So, another way of looking at the *shahids'* attacks on Israeli targets is to see them as a strategic bombing campaign waged by the leading Palestinian organizations whose aim is to demoralize the enemy's civilian population; in other words, to fill it with fear and dread. If we are willing to view the Palestinian suicide attacks in this light, we think it makes sense to compare briefly the latter to the strategic bombing campaigns undertaken by both Axis and Allied air forces during the Second World War. These air attacks, aside from the direct military objectives involved, were intended to weaken the enemy's resolve by terrifying the civilian populations. If this was the intent, what was the effect?

No completely clear-cut answer is possible. On balance though, and certainly in regard to the German Air Force's assault on Britain in 1940, the effect was the opposite of the one intended. Resolve and a desire to strike back at the enemy were apparently widespread reactions.¹⁹ If this was true for the British, is it also true for the Israelis?

Against this background we should now point out the major features and findings of the Resiliency Project study. The questions posed to members of

the Israeli public were designed to tap two forms of fear: personal and national. The questions intended to tap personal fear included two indices; one concerning the effects of terrorism on daily life in Israel, and the other, the respondent's fear that h/she or members of the immediate family would be harmed by a suicide bombing. The items for personal fear were: 'I'm fearful of terrorism that affects my daily life in Israel' and 'I'm fearful of terrorism that would injure me and my family'. National fear was also measured by two indices. These focused on fears about Israeli survival, the extent to which its political system would be shocked by the bombings and the degree to which they posed a 'strategic danger' to the country's survival. The items for measuring national fear were: 'I'm fearful of terrorism within Israel that would startle the political system', and 'I'm fearful of terrorism as a strategic danger to Israel'.

In addition to the indicators of fear, respondents were also asked questions about what they considered to be appropriate Israeli responses to the violence. Questions were posed about the advisability of Israel regarding the development of weapons of mass destruction as a major component of its national security effort. Respondents were also asked if they agreed or disagreed with the following items: 'All means are justified in Israel's struggle against terrorism'; 'Every military action Israel initiates is justified'; 'WMD should be a major component in Israeli national security', and 'In case of a missile attack, Israel is obliged to react with full power'. These questions were clustered together and treated as a single index of militancy.

This paper is probably not the appropriate place for a detailed analysis of the surveys' findings. Nevertheless, some of the major ones should be mentioned at this point in our analysis. First, the levels of both personal fear and national fear rise and fall with frequency of the suicide bombings. The more attacks, the more fearful the Israeli public becomes. Second, the more fearful the public becomes, the higher the level of militancy. In general when Israelis express heightened fears, they respond by advocating the use of stronger measures by the military and the security services to defeat those threatening them and the society of which they feel themselves a part. An exceptionally interesting finding, in our view, is the fact that the most fearful members of the public were the strongest advocates of a militant response, while the least fearful were also the least committed to a militant response by the Israeli authorities. Fear, in other words, promotes an aggressive response aimed at eliminating its source (see Appendix 4).

This finding seems to be consistent with public reactions in such other Western democracies as Italy, Germany and the United Kingdom that were the targets of terrorist campaigns during the 1970s and in the United States

following the 9/11 attacks. In these cases, the public was willing to support enhanced powers for the government to tap telephones and engage in various other 'search and seizure' practices normally prohibited by law – if the powers were exercised for the purpose of bringing about the defeat of terrorist organizations. In some instances, a majority of the public in a few Western European democracies even favored the restoration of the death penalty if it could be applied to 'terrorist murderers'. In short, Israelis have responded to terrorism in approximately the same way as citizens elsewhere in the democratic world. The level of militancy has probably been higher but then again so has the threat to their survival.

Concluding Observations


Academics, journalists and other observers of suicide bombings in Israel and other countries have tended to regard them as *sui generis*. The perpetrators, their handlers and the widespread fear their operations typically elicit among members of the public seem to place them beyond the Pale, and beyond our set of expectations about how 'normal' terrorist attacks are carried out. Our findings, however, point in a somewhat different direction.

The Palestinian suicide-bombers and the reactions they have produced among members of the Israeli public conform to our general understanding of terrorist campaigns as developed in the professional literature on the subject. In general, the *shahids* have had earlier experiences with terrorism and various forms of collective violence. In other words, they have tended to have careers in violence before carrying out their last murderous acts. Much like terrorists active earlier in Europe and Latin America during the 1970s, the suicide bombers have gone through an extended socialization process in the course of which they prepare to play their final roles.

The Israeli public's reaction likewise seems to fit existing understanding in the professional literature on political terrorism. Perhaps the opinions reflected in the surveys are extreme among democratic publics, but so were the events that brought them into being. The public in virtually all the democracies that have experienced terrorist campaigns conducted within their borders have tended to demand a vigorous response from the government aimed at a restoration of a sense of security or public order. If this means the use of extraordinary measures and a weakening of conventional limits on government action, the public has usually reacted, in effect, by saying 'so be it'. In this regard the Israeli public's response to the wave of suicide bombings has been very much like that of other audiences compelled to witness protracted terrorist campaigns in other national settings.

Appendix 1 – Terrorists Attacks

FIGURE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF DIFFERENT MODES OF TERRORIST ATTACKS



*It should be noted that knifings, shootings and remote-control bombs are not suicide attacks. The latter refer to the activation of a bomb by a timer or a terrorist located far away.

Appendix 2 – The Perpetrators

FIGURE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF TERRORIST'S AGE (SUICIDE VS. NON-SUICIDE)




TABLE 1
CHARACTERISTICS OF SUICIDE TERRORISTS

Variable	Suicide Terrorist	
<i>Type of Terrorist Experience in Terror Attacks</i>	First event	20%
	Not first event	80%
<i>Type Of Education</i>	Secular	17.2%
	Religious	82.8%
<i>Ideology</i>	Religious	88.4%
	Nationalist	10.1%
	Left-wing	1.4%
<i>Age</i>	M = 24.5 S.D. = 7.46	
<i>Marital Status</i>	Married	15.8%
	Unmarried	84.2%
<i>SES of Region where the Terrorist Lives (1= high SES, 10= low SES)</i>	M = 5.97 S.D. = 0.38	
<i>Gender</i>	Male	98.7%
	Female	1.3%

Appendix 3 – The Victims

TABLE 2
SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF VICTIMS OF SUICIDE ATTACKS

Variable	Victims	
<i>Occupation</i>	Academic	7.4%
	Blue collar	29.2%
	Pupils	16.1%
	Students	20.4%
	Retirees	12.5%
<i>Gender</i>	Women	46.2%
<i>Age</i>	Below 18	18.6%
<i>Country of origin</i>	Israel	63.6%
	Europe and America	13.2%
	Former Soviet Union	17.1%
	Asia-Africa	6%
<i>Religiosity</i>	Secular	72.9%
<i>Education</i>	Less than high-school	32.2%

Appendix 4 – Public Opinion

FIGURE 3
AVERAGE NUMBER OF SUICIDE ATTACKS AND FEAR OF TERRORISM (%)




FIGURE 4
FEAR OF TERRORISM AND MILITANCY (%)





FIGURE 5
 AVERAGE NUMBER OF SUICIDE ATTACKS, FEAR OF TERRORISM,
 AND MILITANCY (%)



NOTES

1. For a brief history of suicide bombings around the world see, Yoram Schweitzer, 'Suicide Terrorism: Development and main characteristics', in Boaz Ganor (ed.), *Countering Suicide Terrorism* (Herzilya, Israel: The International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2001) pp.75–85.
2. Boaz Ganor, 'Suicide Terrorism: An Overview', in Ganor (ed.), *Countering Suicide Terrorism*, p.1.
3. See, for example, Samuel Katz, *Israel Versus Jibril* (New York: Paragon Books, 1993) pp.130–52.
4. Ariel Merari, 'The Readiness to Kill and Die', in Walter Reich (ed.), *Origins of Terrorism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)
5. For an account see, Robin Wright, *In the Name of God* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989) pp.102–3; See, also, Martin Kramer, 'The Moral Logic of Hizballah', in Walter Reich (ed.), *Origin of Terrorism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990) pp.131–57.
6. Among others, Walter Laqueur calls attention to the strong suicidal motivation or desire to sacrifice the self, to become martyrs in others words, in the actions of many terrorists, sacred and secular. He mentions the Russian revolutionaries in particular; *Terrorism* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1977).
7. Ehud Sprinzak, 'Rational Fanatics' *Foreign Policy* (Sept./Oct. 2000) p.69.
8. Gabriel Ben-Dor, Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger, *National Security Studies Center Bulletin* (Oct. 2002) pp.1–3.
9. See, for example, Yonah Alexander *Palestinian Religious Terrorism* (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2002) pp.1–44.
10. For a good description of the phenomenon see, Asaf Moghadam, 'Palestinian Suicide Bombing in the Second Intifada', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 26 (2003) pp.65–92.
11. Ami Pedahzur, Arie Perliger and Leonard Weinberg, 'Altruism and Fatalism: The Characteristics of Palestinian Suicide Terrorists', *Deviant Behavior* 24:4 (July 2003) pp.405–24.
12. Molly Moore and John Anderson, 'Suicide Bombers Change Mideast's Military Balance', *The Washington Post* (Aug. 18, 2002) p.2.
13. See, for example, Raphael Israeli, 'Islamikaze and Their Significance' *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9:3 (Autumn 1997) pp.96–121; Karin Andriolo, 'Murder by Suicide: Episodes from Muslim History', *American Anthropologist* 104:3 (2002) pp.736–42.
14. See, for example, J. Bowyer Bell, *The Irish Troubles: A Generation of Violence, 1967–1992* (New York, 1993) ad passim.
15. Emile Durkheim, *Suicide* (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1951); see also, Steven Stack, 'Durkheim's Theory of Fatalistic Suicide' *The Journal of Social Psychology* 107 (1979) pp.161–8; Lung-Chang Young, 'Altruistic Suicide: A Subjective Approach', *Sociological Bulletin* 21:2 (1972) pp.103–21.
16. Kathryn Johnson, 'Durkheim Revisited: Why Do Women Kill Themselves?' *Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior* 9 (1979) pp.145–53.
17. The surveys were conducted by telephone twice a year, in Oct. and April 2000–2002. Two thousand individuals were questioned on each occasion. The sample was reasonably representative of the entire Israeli population, but only the responses of Jews (about 80 per cent of the total sample) were included in this analysis. For more details, see nssc.haifa.ac.il.
18. For statements along these lines see, Yonah Alexander, (note 9) pp.343–99.
19. See, for example, Gerhard Weinberg, *A World at Arms* (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994) pp.574–81.

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