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Realizing Hegemony?
Symbolic Terrorism and the Roots of Conflict

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There is curently a division between conflict analysis and studies of terrorism, despite the fact that similar actors are involved in the "new wars" and "new terrorism," and that there are also similarities in terms of root causes. Both conflict and terrorism studies are increasingly crossing disciplines in their attempts to present coherent frameworks and bodies of theory, however. As the divisions between war, peace, conflict and terrorism, between friend and enemy, soldier, criminal, and civilian break down, there is now potential for a critical reading of the insights this presents. The terrain on which violence has been traditionally deployed has now shifted to a more symbolic terrain requiring a reassessment of the assumptions terrorism and conflict studies rest on.

As has been well documented, conflict, political violence, and terrorism are not new phenomena, relating as they do to many historical uses of violence against dominant hegemonic actors and ideologies, and impinging on key issues relating to territorial sovereignty, ideology, self-determination, and political and economic power.[1] Yet there is currently a division between conflict analysis and formal studies of terrorism, despite the fact that these various phenomena and attempts to theorize them have much in common. This division is all the more noteworthy given, first, the fact that similar actors are involved in the "new wars"[2] and the "new terrorism"[3] of the 1990s and later, and also that similar issues are extant in zones riven by conflict or emanating terrorism. Partly, this division has arisen because of conflicting methodologies and ontologies—conflict analysis focuses on roots and institutional responses from states or state-controlled organizations and agencies as well as from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), whereas terrorism studies focuses on individual and group dynamics, legal and military regimes, and prevention within a legalistic and state-centric framework. Both terrorism and conflict studies have owed much to a traditional divide between what occurs within states and between states, though in both sub-disciplines these divides are breaking down.

Transnationalism, non-state actors, and issues of inter-subjectivity have become key parts of their respective structures, though so far little has been done to bring both areas of study into a situation where they can cross-fertilize each other. Yet both conflict and terrorism studies have been forced to cross disciplines in their attempts to present coherent frameworks and bodies of theory.

Indicative of the changes that are occurring in both areas of study are the "new wars" and "new terrorism" debates, which have tended to deconstruct the traditional division between state and non-state actors and issue areas, while at the same time broadening the concept of security away from its traditional state-centric framework to include transnational networks, non-state actors, and objectives. Thus, the divisions between war, peace, low intensity and high-intensity conflict, and terrorism, between friend and enemy, soldier, criminal, and civilian have become relatively indistinct, though the concept of the national state still underpins these "new" frameworks and often is assumed to operate as if these distinctions were still clear. This article sets out to examine the potential for cross-fertilization between conflict analysis and terrorism studies and also to provide a critical reading of the insights this might present with regard to the ways in which the various understandings of these sub-disciplines provide policymakers with the tools to maintain order in the international system.[4]

Terrorism Studies and Conflict Analysis

Key Issues in Terrorism Studies

Wilkinson has argued that the dominant type of insurgency is motivated by ethno-nationalism, which he describes as causing a classic pattern of conflict in which the guerrilla wages a "hypermobile war." He argues that this is the natural weapon of the strategically weaker side.[5] Ultimately both terrorism and guerrilla warfare share this characteristic although the study of terrorism rests on a division between these two types of political violence. Wilkinson presents a clear definition of terrorism as the systematic use of coercive intimidation and fear for political ends, increasingly via media exposure, by "desperate and weak minorities, by states as a tool of domestic and foreign policy, or by belligerents as an accompaniment in all types and stages of warfare."[6] More recently, Wilkinson has argued in the context of the current war against terrorism that there can be a differentiation between "corrigible" and "incorrigible" terrorism, in which a roots debate only about the former is justified. However, in the case of the latter, the challenge is so radical and the consequences so dangerous that there should be no attempts made for accommodation. The pursuit of such terrorists and bringing them to account through legal and possibly also military methods is justified without a roots cause debate.[7] This is interesting because it reflects the debates between conflict management and conflict resolution approaches in terms of the necessity or ability to come to terms with the roots of certain types of conflicts or alternatively maintaining a status quo. Thus, the debate over definitions of terrorism has been rather arcane, implicitly avoiding its legitimation in any way, however minor.

Laqueur argues that one workable definition among the many hundreds that have been offered has been provided by the U.S. Department of Defense: "as the unlawful use of, or threatened use, of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce and intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives."[8] What seems to be notable about such definitions is not so much what type of violence they include, but more how they treat or avoid direct explanations of

motives: as Laqueur has also pointed out (citing Nietzsche), definitions depend on a lack of a historical mutation of phenomena and therefore necessarily cannot be all-inclusive.[9] Indeed he also argues that

> [t]he trouble with terrorism is not that it has always been indefensible but that it has been chosen more often than not as the prima ratio of self-appointed saviours of freedom and justice, of fanatics and madmen, not as the ultimate ratio of rebels against tyranny."[10]

Thus, such fixed definitions depend on an unchanging relationship between the illegitimacy of terrorist objectives, the methods used, and the legitimacy of counterterrorism strategies, yet do not focus on root causes other than through a demonization of actors, methods, and goals.

Recently, there has been much debate about "new terrorism," which is generally less dependent on state support (though some states do still support terror) and is distinguished by a willingness to cause large numbers of civilian casualties, exploiting global networks often utilizing informational technology.[11] Hoffman has argued that this development is far more dangerous, and undermines old assumptions about previous forms of terrorism.[12] This necessitates attempts to develop an understanding of terrorism and move beyond old approaches—many of which are now held to be obsolete. Hoffman points out that understandings of terrorism depend on the viewpoint taken, either from the point of view of the victim or actor.[13] This opens up the debate, moving away from the very problematic objectivization of definitions that both conflict and terrorism studies have tended toward.[14] This inter-subjective approach allows for new turns to be taken in the study of terrorism, and for insights to be imported from interconnecting areas of study, including conflict and war studies that themselves have taken a more philosophical, sociological, and anthropological turn. However, this has also been critiqued from a number of quarters by those who have argued that the old political, ideological, religious, and secessionist motives for political violence should not be too quickly discounted.[15] Copeland in particular has pointed out that an inter-subjective approach "ignores the fundamental differences between terrorism and legitimate or regulated uses of violence."[16] Yet, what if the impetus for the blurring of the distinctions between illegitimate and legitimate uses of force—a common phenomena spanning all forms of violence in the contemporary era—has arisen precisely because this differentiation has become so powerful in terms of political, economic and social forms of hegemony? The danger of universal frameworks, norms, and institutions is that they cannot be completely universal and may be seen as totalizing by some fringe and marginalized actors. This reflects the debates opened up in International Relations (IR) theory by the likes of Walker and others, which have been notable in terms of their attempts to move beyond the common differentials and assumptions that the field has often rested on—in particular, the classic dichotomies of the realist, idealist, and structuralist debates.[17] Yet it seems that in terrorism studies in particular there is a marked resistance to such approaches, despite the fact that such a turn can be justified in terms of policy requirements motivated by the need for responses to new types of security issues.[18]

Consequently, a theme running through the new terrorism literature tends to equate terrorism with wanton violence—in other words, removing the political from this type of violence through an unnecessary, and perhaps very dangerous, sleight of hand (especially given the persistence of terrorism). On the other hand, Hoffman's definition of terrorism implies that it represents an attempt by marginalized actors to effect political change

through the creation of a psychology of fear, particular among those who regard their political and security assumptions to be legitimate and beyond reproach.[19] Thus, the new terrorism challenges value systems and legitimacy in a far more radical way than the older forms of terrorism that focused on recognition, and territorial and political control within the framework of the states-system.[20] Old forms of terrorism challenged political and territorial hegemony whereas new forms challenge the very value systems of the liberal international system. It is amorphous, disparate, subsists on the conflicts between fundamental belief and value systems, and exists in an unregulated void between moral exclusivity and universal norms of legitimacy and centralization. Crucially, and as Copeland has pointed out, terrorism and asymmetric forms of conflict are now perceived as "tools of diplomacy" and so have definitively entered the world of symbols, information, and communicative control which have marked the use and misuse of diplomacy.[21]

Learning from Conflict Studies

Conflict has been generally defined as stemming from the existence of irreconcilable differences between several actors, or caused by structural inequality or injustice, potentially leading to violence at a local, regional or international level. Miall et al. have defined conflict as the pursuit of incompatible goals by different groups.[22] "Conflict" is generally used as a term to describe war and violence, spanning traditional forms of inter-state war to civil and ethnic war. This obviously covers a broad area, including different levels of analysis, interests, issues, and actors in global, regional, and local politics, and opens up a debate about the interconnectedness of the different aspects of conflict. This debate has been very much reflected in the shift from monodimensional to multidimensional approaches to dealing with conflict on the part of international organizations, incorporating economic and political reform as well as human rights, development and democratization into the strategies used to address conflict.[23]

Conflict can be seen as biological (the inherency argument), as psychological, as sociobiological, and as a product of political, economic, and social structures.[24] Galtung has put forward his idea of a conflict triangle that leads to an understanding of the oppositions that create conflict.[25] Burton argued the case for conflict arising out of a repression of certain human needs. Azar developed the concept of protracted social conflict, used to define internal conflicts, often of a post-colonial nature.[26] Gurr also developed the concept of relative deprivation.[27] More recently Miall et al. have argued that contemporary conflict can be characterized as international–social conflict.[28]

The inherency argument sees conflict as inherent to human nature. Developing this essentialist line of thought are theoretical strands of liberalism, which endeavors to establish social, economic and political frameworks that contain and manage conflict via functional institutions and regimes. The Burtonian human needs argument sees conflict as sociobiological, derived from a suppression of a basic hierarchy of human needs requiring social engineering to remove conditions that create violence. The structuralist arguments, perhaps best embodied in the work of Galtung, see conflict as being derived from violence inherent to political, economic, and geopolitical structures, and as such requires incremental structural change to remove oppression. Gurr's relative deprivation approach identifies a sense of injustice as a source of social unrest, and the frustration-aggression approach sees frustration as a necessary or sufficient condition for aggression. Both approaches develop a more psychological understanding of conflict.[29] All of these approaches offer tools that may be used to uncover the roots of conflict and to

develop methods for redressing it. They also have important implications for the nature of peace and order, and the way it is politically, economically, and socially constituted.

More sophisticated critiques of why conflict occurs are now widely gaining credence,[30] indicative in the characterization provided by the notion of "international–social conflict."[31] Many of these critiques depend on the reassessment of political and economic national and transnational structures, as well as the foundation provided by territorial sovereignty. Edward Azar's notion of protracted social conflict has been a significant contribution to the understanding of these post-colonial dynamics. His conceptualization recognizes the prolonged struggle of communal groups for their basic human needs that tend to be obscured by the state-centric nature of the international system.[32] It is significant that Azar has called for an end to the traditional internal/external framework for viewing conflicts (i.e., the practice of drawing boundaries, indicative of citizenship, juridical, and territorial frameworks for the organization of political, economic, social, and administrative power). He has also been critical of the general focus on overt, rather than covert, forms of conflict, and of the European colonial legacy of territorial statehood that he argues elevated single communal groups in multicommunal post-colonial societies and has led to fragmentation and protracted social conflict.[33] Azar also identified the repression and deprivation of human needs as the root of protracted conflicts,[34] and pointed to the role of structural factors, such as underdevelopment, in instances where social groups try to satisfy their needs through conflict. This essentially equates development with peace,[35] something that has recently become part of international peace-building strategies.[36] From this, it can be seen how Azar tried to imagine a more multi-dimensional understanding of conflict, which provided an important additional critique of the many failings of the Westphalian states-system. This has led to a clearer understanding of many post-colonial conflicts, incorporating the aforementioned elements, which can be characterized as international–social conflicts in which the dichotomies of the pillars of the international system (international law, nationalism, territorial sovereignty, and self-determination) accentuate local, social, cultural, and identity-based dynamics of conflict.[37]

Most conflict theories seem to indicate that structures and conditions arise that are understood by entrepreneurs to provide political opportunities for their own advancement, or that conditions become so difficult that mobilization against their cause occurs. This seems to indicate that most conflict is reactive against an identifiable cause, rather than rooted in "evil" or the "primeval." Proponents of violence focus on ends rather than means and draw on cultural, and historical stereotypes, historical myths of the heroic and of the other. They draw on recent structural, political, social, cultural, and economic injustices, and develop perceptions of domestic and international law to make their conflicts "just." Thus, proponents of the use of violence see the environment around them as full of stimuli for their just conflict, having already defined the cause and the enemy, who must now respond with the available tools at their command. Any asymmetry here now leads to heightened perceptions of injustice on the part of the "other" and increases their willingness to exploit alternative forms of political violence where the other's advantage will be minimized.

There has been a growing recognition of the importance of the symbol in conflict studies. Van Creveld has investigated this notion in the evolution of warfare, both in the conduct of war and the constructions of mechanisms through which acts of violence are provoked and justified.[38] Similarly, conflict studies have pointed to a recognition of the role of multiple identities in creating narratives that are used to feed violence and its

initiation.[39] More recently, the subtle merging of debates about intervention and humanitarianism has seen the development of a discourse of humanitarian war in which coalitions of liberal state and nongovernmental actors intervene under the cover of broader military interventions and become involved in political, social, and infrastructural reconstruction aimed at the "normalization" of conflict zones so that they become peaceful in the liberal manner easily recognizable to dominant liberal states.[40] The symbols of this sort of intervention revolve around the UN, regional organizations, and many international NGOs, and acts of violence against such symbols (as seen, for example in Somalia or Bosnia in the 1990s) are indicative of the clash of interests between liberal acts of intervention and the interests of those who exploit or aspire to a culture of violence for their own objectives.

Critical and post-structural approaches to conflict analysis focus on the role of claims to representation, sovereignty, and identity in conflict, as well as the role of the states-system in reproducing some of the essential conditions of asymmetric conflict. Such approaches have made the case that conflict cannot be properly redressed unless more radical analysis of the implications of the root causes debates are undertaken, and similarly that an awareness of the contested nature of the peace and order that might emerge as a result of such analyses and strategies is needed.[41] This is represented in particular in the new ideology of liberal humanitarian intervention. Although such approaches may seem to lack pragmatic application, the insights they provide mirror many of the conceptual problems of conflict, political violence, and terrorism in that they point to the difficulty of making simple assumptions about the nature of violence and the actors involved. Further, they illustrate the problematic way in which the international system and states have tended to draw on similar simple definitional categories to define and legitimate their responses, many of them revolving around the friend/enemy distinction common to all aspects of the Westphalian version of the international system.[42] These dynamics can also be traced between state and non-state actors and issues, as well as with the terrorist/freedom fighter distinctions. Such problems are surely partly why anti-colonial activists, former terrorists, and secessionists have often gained a degree or more of legitimacy once they have been brought into the international system in return for the redressing of some of their grievances. These dynamics also mirror the reasons why there has generally been such a problematic division of labor between conflict analysis and terrorism studies, as represented in Figure 1.

FORMS OF VIOLENCE

Figure 1. The Conflict and Response Spectrum.

Responses to Violence

Clearly, as the earlier discussion has illustrated, our understanding of terrorism and of other forms of political violence may benefit from an exploration of inherent political, communal, social, economic, and structural conflicts, either related to local social, economic, and resource configurations, or to regional and global dynamics related to certain types of international regimes and frameworks. Indeed, arguments that characterize terrorism as merely the product of group and individual psychology, or "evil" are akin to the "primeval" argument about the roots of ethnic conflict, and may obscure the task of redressing the root causes of the phenomena, and more dangerously, may undermine the legitimacy of responses to these phenomena in general. Given that the states-system is crucially constructed on the basis of a broad state and civil level legitimacy, much more work needs to be done here in order to construct responses to terrorism that carry increased legitimacy. This process may perhaps mirror the development of approaches to institutional forms of peacekeeping and peacebuilding since the early 1990s, which for all their faults, attempted to deal with far broader notions of security and justice by focusing on democratization, development, and humanitarian provisions.[43]

Increasingly, debates about war and conflict have recognized the role of the "other," responded to the increasing ambiguity of war, and to the normative changes that have taken place. In Kaldor's new wars, transnational organizations such as NGOs, criminal organizations, and media organizations vie for space with government agencies, international organizations, regional organizations, and other officials, while the conflict plays itself out in the many spaces between the official use of force and violent non-state actors that have usurped the legitimate use of violence, and defy borders and norms of majoritarian governance.[44] According to Ignatieff, responses to this type of new war have become virtual—lives of peacemakers and interveners cannot be risked, but the universal norms of neo-liberal governance must be imposed.[45] Der Derien has argued that this is essentially "virtuous war," with all of the problematic universalist connotations this raises, though its high tech nature raises doubts about its reciprocity.[46] Coker has argued that the West is trying to humanize war,[47] with similar implications.

In light of this, a profitable way of adding to debates around terrorism is to return to the debates surrounding the development of war, which have also had a major impact on the study of conflict. This moves away from the type of definition favored by the U.S. State Department (mentioned earlier).[48] This definition locates terrorism in the conceptual zone of criminal violence, rather than war, and Laqueur notes that it has not found general acceptance; in fact, agreement only tends to rest on the fact that terrorism engenders violence.[49] Entering this debate with the development of the "new wars" argument is perhaps a profitable avenue to pursue. New wars are transnational, dislocated, non-centralized activities that merged the boundaries between states, actors, crime, and violence.[50] Terrorism in its contemporary form can perhaps be described as "beyond war" in these terms, in the sense that although it aims at material injury, its key objective is to impact the virtual, to undermine the belief in the virtuous on behalf of the victim, to attack the symbolic, and to undermine the very assumptions of the target population (particularly related to their security). This is beyond war, because the only stylistic device in use is to turn the understanding of conflict, violence, just war, and the norms of war inside out in order to undermine the crucial claim of the state and the international system to provide security and prosperity, essential in its ability to accrue and retain consensus. Ultimately, terrorism has become a symbolic act, albeit highly

dangerous, but one that tries to undermine assumptions about security, and related norms, but does not realistically expect an overall victory.[51]

The mismatch of actors and strategies in the "new wars" and "new terrorism," characterized by asymmetry, is illustrated in Figure 2. It illustrates how inter-state war tends to be conducted most effectively by opposing armies in distinct territories, whereas in new war and new terrorism, soldiers, guerrillas, and criminals interact in a transnational conflict space where there are no norms or rules governing the use of violence other than maximum damage using the most dangerous weapons available. At this "beyond war" location, unofficial or terrorist actors tend to be most effective if they utilize associated forms of political violence. This is because they increasingly tend to operate in a symbolic space in which symbols of power and control are targeted because civil insecurity is seen to be more effective and attainable through the spread of terror than via the stylized character, and trappings, of inter-state war.

State and violent non-state actors' strategies in war, civil war, and new war/terrorism diminish or increase in effectiveness according to the security discourse with which they are engaged. In state terms, as violent non-state actors become engaged in opposition to the state, state security apparatus diminish in effectiveness, while the more violent non-state actors avoid engaging with states within a state-security discourse, the more effective they become. States have evolved apparatus for managing state-centric conflict and interests relatively efficiently. Violent non-state actors have evolved tactics that are increasingly able to bypass this apparatus. Neither seem to be interested in developing approaches that include the other. However, ultimately, the goal of violent non-state actors is to receive the same resources that states control—the right of non-intervention, of territorial integrity and defined borders, and international legitimacy and recognition. Some terrorist movements go beyond this in the sense that their goal is a more radical outcome outside of the limits defined by the international system.

State hierarchy of security interests   *Non-state hierarchy of security interests*

High effectiveness   Low effectiveness

War: over state territory/resources;
method is interstate conflict

Civil War: over disputed state territory—
civil, ethnic, secessionist, irredentist
conflict issues; method is 'new wars'

Beyond War: issues as above;
method is symbolic terrorism/conflict

Low effectiveness   High effectiveness

Figure 2. Sites of conflict, actors, and mismatch of responses.

It is in fact the asymmetry indicated in Figure 2 that provides one of the main common links between understanding conflict, political violence, and terrorism in the contemporary environment. Although asymmetry always favors state actors in terms of the resources they control and is normally defined using the state as a basic measure of symmetry, this should not obscure the fact that there are also counter-asymmetries in international–social conflict or terrorism that favor violent non-state actors, including their hypermobility (particularly in this era of globalization), the fact that they are not constrained by international regimes, or the norms and laws of just war, and a basic inability to identify such actors readily. In conflict theory asymmetry in terms of international legitimacy, recognition, wealth, and military resources, as well as territory and human rights, is seen as a reason for protracted conflict of low intensity, as well as providing a crucial obstacle to mediation, negotiation, and other attempts at ending conflict. The acuteness of asymmetry, and its psychology, in the international system may be one of the underlying causes of the violent non-state actor, guerrilla, or terrorist's search for the innocent, everyday aspects of day-to-day life in targeted societies that can be used to disguise weapons and war, such as mobile phones, clothes, vehicles, and airplanes. Given this search for the "innocent" to exploit against the local, regional, or global hegemon, the question arises relating to how far assumptions about the "innocent" should be challenged without damaging the liberties that benefit those in which liberal states may well be perceived as provocative by the guerrilla or terrorist. As war in its traditional Westphalian sense becomes more and more stylized by regulations, expectations (such as low or nil casualties), and technology is increasingly exploited in order to create forms of war that conform tightly to Western liberal expectations, the new wars debate indicates that those who lack key international resources such as legitimacy and recognition, wealth, technology, and territory, find themselves more able to meet their "enemy" on a platform of their own making. Rather than meet head on, as, say the Chechen rebels did in their recent secessionist war against Russia, the nature of war has removed itself to a location more comparable to the marauders of the Dark Ages whose objective was not total territorial control, but to spread fear and disable the ability of those who had claimed to provide absolute territorial security, on which their legitimacy rested. Given the increasing transnational flows of people, goods, and services across the planet, therefore, it has become increasingly difficult to prevent violent non-state actors from violently challenging the local or regional political configurations, or to prevent the occasional spectacular terrorist success. This means that there is a need to prevent violence, guerrilla warfare, or terrorism by creating obstacles to the employment of such strategies and preempting the conditions that create these types of conflict in the first place. This means preempting the conditions that allow political entrepreneurs to recruit, and stemming the flow of recruits to their cause, as well as the operation of such entrepreneurs.[52]

Despite the obvious commonalities here, a barrier exists between conflict analysis and terrorism studies, partly because conflict analysis focuses on the causes of conflict and broad responses whereas terrorism studies seems to focus on networks of actors, group dynamics, and narrow responses relating to legal regimes, intelligence, and policy, all of which engender a particular ontology and epistemology. Further, a definitional problem with terrorism arises because of the general lack of acceptance of the existence of a normative question about what it is—a challenge to hegemony by attacking targets associated with the dominant sociopolitical and economic framework of dominant states and the states-system that itself is a product of Western political thought and cultural experiences. From this point of view it is a challenge to the legitimacy of the secular

states-system, previously agreed-on values, majoritarian democracies, and the liberties and constraints entailed by the regimes that exist in this framework. The standard binary created by this understanding in the definitional debate is "one man's freedom fighter is another man's terrorist." This definitional problem also exists (though it is much less politicized) in the study of conflict in which it might be said that "one man's soldier is another man's rebel." This is based on a positivist epistemology and the ontology associated with the modernist era in which oppositional definitions produce distortions and inflexibilities in understanding and explaining, and may also result in distorted policy prescriptions and solutions. However, although conflict analysis now seems to have become more fully engaged with "understanding" as well as "explaining," the former is an area that terrorism studies seem to avoid, partly because of the fear of conveying any legitimacy toward terrorists by trying to understand their motivations from the inside.[53] This fear is produced by the methodological and epistemological approaches generally applied that result in ontological binaries. Clearly, in the contemporary environment, soldier, criminal, rebel, terrorist, and freedom fighter may be plausible concurrently, this being a product of the fact that there are competing and fluctuating identities, perceptions, and worlds "out there." Yet because of the overwhelming weight of the states-system and the legal, political, and geospatial regimes it has created, the dominant understanding of terrorism is based on this binary. Indeed, this bears comparison with conflict management approaches, which depend on the reconstitution of states and focus on producing a modicum of stability while not addressing the broader ethical issues that a post-conflict status quo might entail. This approach finds its legitimation via the discourse of asymmetry that privileges structural, military, and economic power for neoliberal and democratic ends, and is often exactly what motivates rebels, guerrillas, secessionists, and terrorists to attempt to overturn hegemony to create their own states or zones of exclusion that they control.

Yet, clearly terrorism studies start from the premise that the existing international order is worth preserving and clearly fears asking the question, "What if the international order is partly to blame for provoking such actions?" This should not be taken as apportioning blame, but is representative of the fact that this area of study is driven by the need for policy prescriptions via historical and psychological analysis because of its close connection with the policy world and intelligence community. In conflict studies, such questions are now being asked in an endeavor to build a broader understanding of the multiple causes of conflict and more multidimensional ways of treating it.[54] However, such approaches are also driven by "expert analysis" mainly from the policy arena, though within academic circles there is increasingly an engagement with the underlying ontological questions raised by conflict and also by how the international community chooses to intervene.[55]

Beyond War?

A profitable area of examination, therefore, is to examine the roots of conflict debates in conflict theory because ultimately the use of terror is a form of conflict—the employing of available means of violence against an "other," which is perceived to stand juxtaposed to the objectives of actors prepared to use violence or terror. This has led to the phenomena of "symbolic war," or perhaps a better and more neutral term would be "symbolic conflict." This is more usefully defined as a form of international–social conflict. The global symbol is its theatre, and it operates at the level of the symbolic and the

assumed. By attacking the valued symbols and assumptions of the hegemon its impact in this global era is akin to the fall or gain of strongholds or territories in the imperial era. If non-state and terrorist actors cannot win "real" war, they feel they might be able to win these symbolic conflicts. Winning here is characterized by gaining international exposure and opening up new perspectives in relevant political debates to a broader audience. Whether they can "win" such conflicts or not is perhaps immaterial, though clearly, the likes of Al Qaida have indicated an objective of destabilizing the U.S.-dominated global order. Realistically, it is unlikely that even with weapons of mass destruction violent non-state actors could prevail against states in this form of conflict, as in any other, but damage could be caused, casualties inflicted, and terror propagated. Indeed, it is the latter that poses a key threat in an international political and economic environment whose being and survival is predicated on liberal freedoms. As Der Derian and Ignatieff have pointed out, war is virtual, though not necessarily virtuous.[56]

The new wars/new terrorism debates provide a picture of violent non-state actors, sometimes funded by transnational criminal networks and renegade states, applying guerrilla warfare and acts of terror for secessionist or irredentist aims, motivated by ideological, political, economic, linguistic, and cultural reasons, or purely for profit. This involves complex transnational networks, and a particularistic ideology, perhaps free-riding on the international norms of self-determination and sovereignty. Local entrepreneurs must recruit and mobilize, organize, and harness resources brought into the conflict zone or required for an attack. A second picture is provided by the random acts taken against facilities and symbols of hegemonic powers by ideological actors operating beyond the confines of the states-system and beyond the regimes governing the use of violence as a political tool. In both instances, a root causes debate is quite obviously necessary—it is not enough to say that such activity is illegal as this does not help explain why such actions take place in opposition to domestic or international law.

Conflict studies provides a basis for a root causes debate through the interdisciplinary theoretical framework it offers, which spans the full breadth of social and international theory: something from which terrorism studies seems to have become divorced. One of the reasons for this is that the investigation of terrorism's roots may undermine the facility to intervene through force by legitimating a causes debate, possibly at the expense of legal and normative regimes that govern both the use of violence and the nature of the states-system. This view may be potentially damaging because as the UN has found in its dealings with conflict, prevention, however implausible, may be better that an attempted cure.[57]

Furthermore, in the study of conflict, peace researchers and other structuralists have long pointed to the difficulty of understanding justice and legitimacy in non-state-centric forms of conflict, termed asymmetric.[58] Indeed, more recently there have been strong critiques of the tendency to try to apply Western-centric, -positivist, and -rationalist frameworks to understanding increasingly fragmented forms of conflict, which, by reducing ethnic conflict to a security dilemma,[59] for example, may reproduce the very conditions that might have stimulated certain aspects of the conflict in the first place. Yet, it seems that such modes of explaining and understanding are still applied to conflict, political violence, and terrorism in many quarters, most notably in policy circles that are increasingly seeing such forms of political violence as the most serious threat to international order in the post–Cold War world. In many ways, this is of course true, and not just in terms of the access of violent non-state actors to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Such threats, whether local, regional, or global threaten the substance

of the international system and its reliance on Western cultural, political, social, and economic models as *universally* applicable. In essence, such uses of violence are attempts to voice challenges to that order by individuals and groups that feel that only violence will be listened to. Again, the problem of the margin is raised, and in the contemporary environment the marginalized are increasingly able to undermine the system through the exploitation of otherwise innocent technologies in a globalized and glocalized world, and possibly even through access to WMD. What is more, it is increasing difficult if not impossible to differentiate the marginalized from the civilian—indeed, in terms of finances it is often very difficult to differentiate civilian funds from those intended for violent purposes.

Suddenly, state boundaries thought to be long secured are almost irrelevant in providing security at this level. Symbolic conflict indicates that the military might of dominant members of the international society, which has been constructed to be aimed solely at the projection of power and control of territory, is impotent against a deterritorialized,[60] random, and global perpetrator of symbolic violence. This is a crucial aspect of the new wars/new terrorism, although it is also important to note that this phenomena has a long provenance that was mainly ignored during an era of inter-state and ideological conflict. This phenomena has moved beyond the normal constraints that have organically developed over centuries of development in the international system, and has deserted the expected and prepared battlefield in which asymmetries were increasingly loaded against rebels, radicals, and extremists, to a zone beyond the battlefield where such asymmetries are far reduced. In this metaphorical zone, the symbolism of grand devices such as the attacks on the United States in 2001 by suicide terrorists marks a new battle zone in which the instruments of mass territorial attack are useless. Indeed those terrorists hid behind their lack of consensus, believing that the United States would not employ similar strategies against the symbols they hold dear. Far from a virtual war in which technology increases the distance between combatants and sterilizes the acts of violence that occur while globalization brings the results into the homes of every civilian, these new forms will not lead to devastated territories of the scale of the wars of the twentieth century, but will seek a new mediation of the structures and frameworks that project hegemony across the planet. Ultimately, this is what terrorism has become. It is a marker of the exclusion of dangerous minorities and groups that defy the need for broad political consensus, of cultural and economic hegemony, as a desperate voicing of a fast disappearing otherness whose legitimacy is under threat and in doubt. It is also an unacceptable challenge to democratic states and the majoritarian-backed status quo. Just as with new wars and non-state actors or indistinguishable combatants, this is a dangerous expression of inconsistencies in the international system. Thus, terrorism is about symbolically disputing the legitimacy of the hegemon, both to its own constituent audience and to that of the hegemon.[61]

In essence the development and sophistication of these types of violence has illustrated how modernity and its rationalization and capitalization of individuals, territory, and power can be circumvented by those who perceive that the existing rules, structures, and norms do not include them and actively marginalize them. Ultimately, such actors have been able to turn modernity's definition of the legitimate use of violence, understanding of the enemy, and the territorial configurations of power against itself. This has created a security dilemma in that the international community has endeavored to use the international system to assimilate such challenges in order to validate the universal norms it propagates. This has resulted in the determination by some marginalized actors to challenge such approaches by using ever more devious and violent methods to

express their difference and to resist forms of hegemony, which they perceive to threaten their value systems, and associated ideologies. Indeed we have seen a return of ideology in attempts to use culture, religion, and other forms of identity as a mobilizing tool to counter the dominance of Western states, and to justify violent actions on the basis of being a last resort.

The likes of Mao, Che Guevara, Mandela, and Gandhi contributed to this "beyond war" location by their resistance against forms of hegemony that they identified as oppressing their own peoples and suppressing their economic, cultural, and political development and ideology. As exponents of change, reform, and revolution they moved through different phases of reaction and responded in different manners. Mao pioneered guerrilla warfare. Gandhi reacted against Western imperialism and British control of India by trying to use a policy of passive resistance from within the system by appealing to what he felt where the cultural proclivities of his people to respond to oppression. This effectively reduced the legitimacy of the use of colonial instruments of political control in the eyes of domestic and international constituencies. Che Guevara attempted to spread revolution in the political and social development of local and international constituencies by preaching a revolutionary struggle against Western hegemony and capitalism. He also aimed to create an international revolution against what he saw as the careless and oppressive control of peoples by the West. Mandela was empowered by a revival of African (Xhosa) culture within his own country, and tried to respond along peaceful lines to White domination of his own country until he believed that a violent struggle was the only way forward. Upon imprisonment he effectively was unable to coordinate such an operation but became a symbol of resistance against totalizing alien cultures and their political systems, and ultimately aided the breakdown of apartheid. All of these movements have been illustrative of alternative responses to hegemony, beyond war in its Western, rationalist form. Similarly, the quests of many non-state or terrorist actors espouse an antihegemonic ideology of some sort. Indeed, both left-wing and right-wing motivations for terrorism focus on either the repulsion of a socially unjust form of hegemony in the case of the former, or the creation of exclusionary structures based on sociobiological characteristics that are used to justify their dominance in the case of the latter.[62]

Thus, in the case of asymmetric conflict, and in particular terrorism, it must be assumed that violent non-state actors and terrorists, given their belief in the extreme asymmetry of the hegemonic situation they are faced with, believe that their only option is the escalation of violence regardless of its legitimacy, legality, or short-term costs. In short, asymmetry, while providing a level of security for the majority, may also enhance the likelihood of challenges by disempowered actors.

The question of asymmetry is one that merits further attention, based as it is on an essentialist reading of the international system as a legalist construct of territorial entities. It is this legalist reading of the international system that has proven particularly problematic in terms of ending low-intensity conflicts. Insofar as much of the international framework dealing with territorial sovereignty, self-determination, and self-determination is overshadowed by a lack of consensus, and has become a dead letter in many territorial zones, the asymmetry of this type of conflict has led to asymmetric actors adopting ever more deviant approaches to how they present, internationalize, conduct, and end the conflicts in which they are engaged. As they are involved in conflicts against the overwhelming weight of the international system, its regimes, constructs, and consensus, "asymmetric" actor's strategies have increasingly been to use the system against itself, exploiting its grey areas, weaknesses, foibles, and inconsistencies. An early indication of

this can be seen in the anticolonial movements that focused on the separate right of self-determination of sub-national groups in a philosophical sense, rather than accepting the pragmatic approach of the colonial powers that self-determination was a mechanism that could only be applied to colonies as existing territorial political units.[63] Latter day terrorism can be seen to be a contemporary example of this in which aspects of the globalized international system are used to undermine perceived hegemonic forces in an anti-neo-colonial struggle. This somewhat complex process can be seen as a new method of countering what are viewed to be neo-colonial activities in which terrorist actors choose to use violence on a terrain in which they believe states cannot respond as effectively.

A further point of debate in the conflict literature, particularly as a result of the new wars debates around intervention, relates to the normative implications of conflict and any responses to it. Should actors respond to humanitarian problems caused by conflict and should any settlement be based on a just view of a solution or should justice be secondary to order. Are there universal norms on which to base this view of justice? In other words, should there be a positive peace or is a negative peace the best that can be achieved?[64] Such debates have been important in the contemporary discussions of humanitarian intervention and to the settlement of intra- and trans-state conflict, and they are relevant when it comes to terrorism. In this terrain, violence is used as a challenge to the peace and security of civilians, and is used to symbolically undermine the international order in the same way that asymmetric actors in intra-state conflicts attempted to undermine the unity of the state. Can we afford to follow ethical guidelines if we are going to deal with terrorism or do the ends justify the means? This depends on how ethical guidelines are constructed of course, but the lessons of contemporary debates in conflict theory would seem to indicate that if a long term "end" to the violence perpetrated at this level can be achieved, considerations of the "other" and roots causes must be addressed at the same time as taking all necessary measures to protect the integrity and unity of the system under threat and those who supply it with the necessary validating consensus. However, drawing lessons from conflict theory here indicates that dealing with the roots of the conflict and taking necessary security measures can be contradictory in that security responses can provide fuel for ethnic or terrorist entrepreneurs to stoke the fires of resistance.

A key problem with such approaches is the somewhat disputed existence of key universal norms that can be applied to rescue failed states and war-torn regions. If the argument is to be made that conflict, political violence, and terrorism emanate from disaffected margins and that this justifies all responses (which is the main argument made in favor of intervention, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding, by the UN or other actors in places such as Bosnia, East Timor, or Kosovo), the source of that consensus must be indicated. A cursory glance at the General Assembly or Security Council as key world bodies indicates the fragility of the argument, though this is also where any level of cosmopolitan agreement is to be found. Other bilateral and multilateral agreements about intervention or the response to conflict and terrorism that are not based on a broad consensus have the advantage that narrow agreements involving less actors are more easily found, and are perhaps easier to enact if the parties have the required resources. This occurs at the expense of a broader legitimacy, however. Other world bodies such as the World Bank often act as if they were instruments of Western values and structures, and receive criticism for this. Of course, the counterargument that because of a lack of global consensus, intervention or responses merely add oil to the fire give dominant actors little leeway to protect the order that they have nurtured and

guaranteed. Perhaps, as Michael Ignatieff has written, "the function of liberal society is not merely to teach the noble fiction of human universality, but to create individuals, sufficiently robust in their own identity, to live by that fiction."[65] Yet it does not help that the symbol of liberal internationalism and its message of human universality, the United Nations, has "become the West's mercy mission to the flotsam of failed states left behind by the ebb tide of empire."[66] If the West had believed in this universality, surely it would have put more effort into defending its position rather than adopting a pragmatic selectivity that erected *cordon sanitaires* around territories deemed to be problematic but too insignificant to address, thus turning them into safe havens for anti-hegemonic actors and extreme political violence. Clearly, however, a body of international treaties aimed at combating terrorism is now emerging on the basis of a cosmopolitan agreement, notably in the forum of the UN.[67]

If approaches to ending conflict lose legitimacy because they cannot deal with the other in a manner that the other also accepts is legitimate, the resort to terrorism becomes more likely, as does the use of force to counter it. Terrorism has become the tool of those who identify themselves as having a just cause and an inability to express it in conventional political or military terms. Given the fact that international architecture for the use of violence to respond to threats to the system revolves around state-centric apparatus, alliances of states and international organizations have little choice but to structure their intervention in terms of attacks on states seen to be harboring terrorists. Once terrorist action occurs, past history teaches that there is little that can be done to bring its proponents into the mainstream without significant political and ultimately also normative concessions. The danger with normative concessions is that they may eventually lead to an undermining of the value system under attack, and thus a general refusal to cooperate, communicate, or negotiate with terrorists until a political front has been established or appropriated. But given the symbolic turn that terrorism has taken, it is unlikely that this can occur.

One key aspect of the new terrorism has been that it is able to exploit new strategies in which technology, resources, and freedoms belonging to (or claimed by) the victim are turned against the victims themselves. Though it is easy to point to terrorist cells gaining funding and training from a "world" beyond the victim, this means that terrorism is ultimately violence from within. There are no demarcations other than those provided by the ambiguous strategies, technologies, ideals, and norms applied. Liberal states are therefore extremely susceptible to this type of symbolic activity—yet, ultimately this is a clear validation of liberal states, though to a far lesser extent, of the states-system. It was a flaw in the world-view of the organizations and agencies that are supposed to preserve an international system in which liberal states are secure that led to the failure to deal with the long-standing conflict and economic situation in Afghanistan, and which left it a haven for terrorist and anti-counterhegemonic activity. The same could also be said about Kashmir, Iran, North Korea, Zimbabwe, Sudan, and Iraq, which are illustrative of the failure of international mechanisms such as the UN to preserve the international system by focusing on the most immediate and serious threats to liberal state survival. Perhaps the U.S. exploitation and withdrawal from the UN is also partly to blame. Certainly the lack of interest in dealing with the asymmetry question has pushed asymmetric actors into counterhegemonic activities and the attempt to create, and legitimate their use of, a counterhegemonic ideology. This is illustrative of the need for state-centric agencies and organizations to focus more attention and resources on the roots of conflicts in zones that appear not to have any impact on liberal political, social, and economic interests.

Conclusion

Is terrorist activity the deranged expression of the politically immature, the zealous expression of conflicting ideologies, be they religious, political, cultural, or the (unacceptable) expression of those who, qualifying on the grounds of all or several of the aforementioned, find themselves unable to make any sort of impact on the conduct of International Relations, the global economy, dominant ideologies and norms? How far are such activities a challenge to developed countries in the fold of Western norms of social, political, and economic behavior to produce and reproduce a watertight international, transnational, and local security system against those who rebel against the dominant norms and myths that are propagated? Or is this challenge itself a red herring, the key being to find a way of assuaging such feelings so that the inevitable weaknesses of states' security systems are not exploited and turned against them by those who feel justified to do so because they perceive such systems and approaches to be exploiting them, or simply because they aspire to an ideology of violence? What is more, why is it that terrorist organizations seem to find security and succor from the reach of the West in conflict zones that have not been "pacified," and have not yet succumbed to the Western ideologicalization that goes with its social, political, and economic approaches to making peace on the periphery? Is the fact that the West contributed to the cauldron of Afghanistan and then failed to apply concerted peacekeeping, mediation, and peace-building, preferring instead to characterize the region as beyond Western interests, partly to blame for the visiting of anti- and counterhegemonic activities against the West and its interests partly from Afghanistan? The dynamics of these debates are familiar—to take global responsibility, practically and normatively, probably suppressing difference and resistance, or to erect *cordon sanitaires*: that is, to create closed zones of conflict and devote resources to protect the "Western fortress" against such acts. Such debates are familiar to those dealing with ethnic, religious, linguistic, and secessionist forms of conflict, particularly in the post-imperial context. Clearly there is so much in common in any comparison between asymmetric conflicts involving non-state actors and many instances of terrorism that the two phenomena share common roots and can no longer be looked on as separate.

The roots of such anti—and counterhegemonic acts within conflict and as part of terrorist strategies can be seen to lie at several different levels, according to the various "roots of conflict" debates. They lie in the religious and political ideologies that challenge the supremacy of the dominant Western ideologies. They lie in the failure of the international regimes that exist to deal with poverty and deprivation, human rights, development, and aid. They lie also in the failure of international society to deal with the long-standing disjuncture between territorial sovereignty and self-determination, and the self-replicating nature of sovereignty. They also lie in the failure of international mechanisms to deal with conflict, and the tendency to believe that collapsed and failed states beyond the direct interests of the West cannot make an impact on world affairs and can be ignored. Many of these assumptions are based on the often criticized belief that small groups and individuals are not part of the meaningful picture of international relations, and that states, "good" or "bad," are all that matters and can be differentiated via their support for irredentist or terrorist groups. These failures in understanding, explaining, and therefore in the construction of mechanisms and organizations to respond, carry much of the blame for the fact that the post–Cold War era has become one of fragmentation. This has been characterized by a symbiosis between counter- and anti-

hegemonic political activities, and transnational organized crime has moved the locus of control of the means of violence from the state and the legitimate apparatus it has evolved to all of those groups and actors that can mobilize an alternative ideology of legitimacy, and legitimize their own use of violence to their followers. This development has given rise to new and far less predictable methods of violence, not governed by any legal or international conventions and codes precisely because they are a challenge to their existence. This, then, is the terrain of symbolic terrorism (something akin to what Laqueur has termed "megaterrorism"—acts that spark massive and violent conflagrations).[68]

The problem with much of the literature on conflict and terrorism is that it does not fully expand debates about how and why the roots of conflict might be relevant, instead focusing on strategic and policy frameworks for dealing with, and preventing, conflict or terrorism via legal, police, and military intervention structures. This oversight is related to the legitimization debates, and the fears of those approaching these phenomena from the position of "explaining" from the outside. Attempts to take an inside view that reflects the roots, dynamics, and processes of political violence may have the effect of undermining the management processes and legitimating the claims of the exponents of violence. The "Leviathans" faced with dealing with terrorism fear the pin-pricks terrorists cause if they do use methods of terror. A more balanced approach, dealing with root causes, prevention and punishment would increase the legitimacy of the responses to terrorism, both at home, and in the eyes of the communities from which terrorism springs while avoiding moves that might replicate such acts in the future. This is a very simple equation: the more the policy establishment avoids facing the deep roots of violence, the deeper those roots will reach. The crucial dilemma revolves around how to avoid legitimizing violence while responding to the complex roots of violence.

Ultimately, this exploration of the roots of conflict debates finds that although they themselves may well be lacking in some areas, they have also provided a basis for the development of a more reflective understanding of conflict. This has important implications for the understanding of terrorism, old and new, as a particular expression of actors involved in conflict in a world in which lines, boundaries, and borders no longer can be used to hide the dynamics and processes that occur across and around them. Ultimately, this article can be read as a call for a more diverse and interdisciplinary, multilevel, and multidisciplinary approach to contemporary conflict and the extreme expression of antihegemonic activity found in "new terrorism," which has increasingly moved into the terrain of symbolic action. There is a need to search not just for those using violence, but also why they use violence. This requires an investigation of the complex social, economic, cultural, and religious conditions that might give rise to anti- or counterhegemonic ideologies and fanaticism. This requires that conflict, peace, and terrorism studies take seriously an investigation into socioeconomic and political prevention, which requires a much more broad-ranging response than merely the development of legislation or an understanding of terrorist psychology or cell dynamics. The development of peacebuilding approaches in Afghanistan, for example, seems to herald a more comprehensive and broader approach to the problems associated with conflict and terrorism. This seems to have slightly shifted the emphasis from intelligence, policing, and legislative approaches to a preventative approach more focused on the roots of conflict. Thus, more reflexivity makes sense in policy terms. An approach to ending and resolving violence that is reflexively constructed in terms beyond the state-centric concept of national interest would have more chance of becoming institutionalized into the sociopolitical framework of the conflict environment and would endeavor to prevent

itself from inadvertently sparking off new rounds of conflicts. Ultimately, reflexive policy responses to new wars and new terrorism would be more effective in preventing future occurrences.

In a sense, non-state conflict and terrorist activities may be described as a product of contemporary Realpolitik, but in which the objectives of certain actors are so far submerged within the technological, capitalist, and democratic culture of the liberal states-system, and proponents constitute such a minute minority, that the art and practice of warfare has mutated from the stylized clashes of states and their massive physical resources, to minute, minimalist, symbolic acts aimed at sites located outside of traditional security debates and so assumed to be secure by those who practice policy in traditional terms. Rather than army fighting army, [intelligence] network now fights [terrorist] network. This produces similar insecurities, because the symbolic sites targeted are so heavily valued, but also because these struggles would be very dangerous if WMD were used. The use of WMD may redress the asymmetries between states and violent non-state actors. This fear releases states to use their own legitimate means of violence against violent non-state actors (perhaps secessionists) and terrorists. Within this spiral of violence is a discourse about legitimacy that is inherently mutually exclusive, raising the question of how "legitimate" and comprehensive exclusive forms of legitimacy actually are.[69] Ultimately, this kind of exploitation of violence is designed to make the hegemon realize its hegemony and force it to pay a price for not having realized it in those terms before. Actions of violence and terrorism have become an attack on the very basic assumptions, long presented as beyond reproach, of the Western framed and dominated liberal international system. From acts aimed at reinforcing claims to separate territories and sovereignty in secessionist and irredentist conflicts to acts aimed at targets representing Western wealth and secular sociopolitical dominance, this basic objective holds true. Consequently, an "effective" use of violence, perhaps by a state-defined terrorist organization that spreads terror and insecurity, creates publicity, and (re)defines a complex friend–enemy relationship that may challenge the very basic foundational assumptions of a state or regional association, or the international system. The same has increasingly been true of actors in conflicts dominated by asymmetry, a product of the overwhelming advantages caused by the control of sovereignty and recognition in the international system.[70] This mismatch extends into many different aspects of the comparison between traditional state-centric war (around which the international system was constructed to maintain order), civil, ethnic, and transnational conflict (which the international system has struggled with since the end of the Cold War), and terrorism. David has met Goliath, but this time in the parable that may be most representative of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, legitimacy is popularly defined as being on the side of Goliath. Yet as this story illustrates, the cumbersome machinery of the strong has chinks that inhibit their ability to respond to potential attacks. In the contemporary environment, new/asymmetrical conflict and terrorism demands that states must sometimes adopt a less sophisticated discourse of security in order to ensure the survival of the legitimacy of the international system itself, which ironically rests on its ability to provide the majority with security and legitimates itself via a universal concern for the increasingly broadly defined security of all. Yet, because the international order-producing system is so heavily geared to state-centric conflict, the new wars and symbolic forms of terrorism characterized by a clash of networks and the differing resources they control, tests its ability to its limits.

Notes

1. For a discussion of the many aspects of these debates see Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham, & Tom Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999).

2. Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999).

3. See, for example, Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism* (Oxford: OUP, 1999).

4. See Oliver P. Richmond, *Maintaining Order, Making Peace* (London: Palgrave, 2002), for an elaboration of the conflict analysis aspects of this.

5. Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism versus Democracy* (London: Frank Cass, 2001), p. 10

6. Ibid., p. 10

7. Paul Wilkinson, Valedictory Lecture, University of St. Andrews, Fife, Scotland, 28 April 2002.

8. Cited by Laqueur, *The New Terrorism,* p. 5.

9. Ibid. p. 6.

10. Ibid. pp. 9–10.

11. For a recent and interesting critique of the "new terrorism" see David Tucker, "What is New about the New Terrorism and How Dangerous is It?," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13(3) (Autumn 2001), pp. 1–14.

12. Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1998), p. 200.

13. Ibid., p. 31.

14. For a recent discussion of the methodology of terrorism research, see Andrew Silke, "The Devil You Know: Continuing Problems with Research on Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13(4), pp. 1–14.

15. See in particular, Thomas Copeland, "Is the 'New Terrorism' Really New?," in *The Journal of Conflict Studies* 21(2) (2001), pp. 7–27.

16. Ibid*.,* p. 9.

17. Rob Walker, *Inside/Outside* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). See also Robert Cox with T. Sinclair, *Approaches to World Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

18. Copeland, "Is the 'New Terorrism' Really New?," p.8.

19. Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism,* p. 43.

20. Ibid*.,* p. 87.

21. Copeland, "Is the 'New Terorrism' Really New?," p. 15.

22. Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, pp. 19–20.

23. See Richmond, *Maintaining Order, Making Peace*, esp. Chapter 5.

24. See Walter Isard, *Understanding Conflict and the Science of Peace* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992), esp. chapters 2, 4, & 5.

25. Johan Galtung, *Peace By Peaceful Means: Peace And Conflict, Development and Civilization* (London: Sage, 1996), p. 72.

26. E. A. Azar, "Protracted International Conflicts: Ten Propositions," in J. Burton and E. A. Azar, *International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice* (London: MacMillan, 1986), p. 29.

27. Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

28. Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, p. 77.

29. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel;* J. Dollard, L. Doob, W. Miller, O. Mowrer, and R. Sears, *Frustration and Aggression* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939). See also W. Runciman, *Relative Deprivation and Social Injustice* (London: Penguin, 1972), esp. chapters 2 and 3; L. Berkowitz, *Aggression: Its Causes, Consequences and Control (*New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993).

30. For one important contribution see Vivienne Jabri, *Discourses on Violence*: *Conflict Analysis Reconsidered* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1996).

31. Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, pp. 77–78.

32. Edward E. Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict* (Hampshire, UK: Dartmouth Publishing, 1990), pp. 10–12.

33. Ibid., p. 7.

34. Ibid., p. 9.

35. Ibid., p. 155.

36. See in particular, Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars* (London: Zed Books, 2001).

37. Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, p. 77.

38. Martin Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (London: Cassel 1991).

39. For a ground-breaking discussion of this see in particular, Vivienne Jabri, *Discourses on Violence.*

40. See Michael Ignatieff, *Virtual War* (London: Vintage Books, 2001); James Der Derien, *Virtuous War* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001).

41. See Richmond, *Maintaining Order*, esp. Conclusion.

42. This Westphalian system rests on secular, nationally, and territorially defined political units which interact with each other in international relations. See Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1998), p. 168, for a discussion of this. He notes that a post-Westphalian order, which he frames as dialogic, overcomes the obstruction that sovereignty, territoriality and citizenship have created for this "universal communication community," which has important implications, I argue, for the practice of ending conflict.

43. Richmond, Op. Cit., esp. Chapter 5.

44. Kaldor, *New and Old Wars,* p. 4.

45. Ignatieff, *Virtual War*, Op. Cit., pp. 4–5.

46. Der Derien, *Virtuous War.*

47. Christopher Coker, *Humane Warfare (*London: Routledge, 2001), p. 40.

48. Cited in Laqueur, *The New Terrorism*, p. 5.

49. Ibid., p. 6.

50. Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, p. 4.

51. Certainly, the new terrorism suggests that it expects an overall victory, but it is suggested here that this may not be the case, and that realistic expectations revolve around short-term disablement and incremental reforms.

52. There has been a history of success, however, for such actors: Arafat has received increasing recognition since he addressed the UN General Assembly in the mid-1970s; Sinn Fein and the IRA; EOKA; the KLA; the Kurds in South East Turkey have all benefited from the perceived abilities of non-state actors to gain representational concessions through terrorism (often through the establishment or appropriation of political fronts).

53. For an elaboration of the "explaining and understanding" framework see Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations* (London: Clarendon Press, 1991). This is generally true at the policy level, though there are academic researchers engaged in building up an inside picture of terrorists and their organizations. See Laqueur, *The New Terrorism.*

54. Richmond, *Maintaining Order.*

55. See Jabri, *Discourses on Violence*; see also, Oliver P. Richmond, "Towards a Genealogy of Peacemaking: The Creation and Recreation of Order," *Alternatives* 26(3) (2001), pp. 317–348.

56. Der Derien, *Virtuous War*; Ignatieff, *Virtual War.*

57. This was a significant part of Boutros Boutros Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* (1992).

58. See for example, Johan Galtung, Carl G. Jacobsen, and Kai Frithjof Brand-Jacobsen, *Searching for Peace* (Pluto Press, 2001).

59. By this is meant the phenomena where ethnic political discourse is securitized and comes to revolve around perceptions of threats that lead to escalations of violence. As Buzan has argued, intersubjective considerations in security discourses, such as perceived threats against values and norms, leads to the securitization of issues at the heart of conflict. B. Buzan, "Rethinking Security after the Cold War," *Cooperation and Conflict* 32(1) (1997), pp. 5–28.

60. Jan Art Scholte has argued that deterritorialization is a crucial aspect of globalization. Jan Art Scholte, *Globalisation: A Critical Introduction* (London: Macmillan, 2000), p. 3.

61. It might even be possible to conceptualize the threat of WMD in this framework, given that access to such weapons is still generally controlled by states given their complexity and expense, and therefore the claim to be able to attain access to such weapons is actually more important than physical possession in the short term.

62. For a further discussion of these motivations for terrorism see Laqueur, *The New Terrorism*, particularly chapters 3 and 4.

63. *U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/2* and Add.1 (United Nations publications, Sales No.: 1949.V.4)- *ILC Report, A/925 (A/4/10),* 1949, part II, par. 45.

64. These definitions of peace draw on the work of Galtung. See J. Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," *Journal of Peace Research* 13(2) (1971), pp. 81–117.

65. Michael Ignatieff, *The Warrior's Honour* (London: Vintage 1999), p. 71.

66. Ibid., p. 79

67. See *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents*, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 14 December 1973; *International Convention against the Taking of Hostages,* adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 17 December 1979; *International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings*, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 15 December 1997; *International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,* adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1999.

68. Laqueur, *The New Terrorism*, p. 282.

69. Danilo Zolo, *Cosmopolis: Prospects for World Government* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), pp. 14–15. See also, Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1998), p. 16.

70. See Karin Aggestam, "Mediating Asymmetric Conflict," *Paper presented at the Fourth Pan-European International Relations Conference,* University of Kent, Canterbury, UK, 8–10 September 2001.